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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we answer two research question in corporate finance. In
the first essay, “A New Benchmark: Relative Performance Evaluation with Total
Returns”, we revisit the question of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in execu-
tive compensation. While previous literature has commonly rejected the use of RPE
when using equity returns as performance measure, we argue that the total return
of the firm is a preferable metric in RPE regressions since the exogenous common
shocks analyzed in extant theory occur at the asset level. Further, it is plausible that
executives are concerned about the total value of the firm since shareholders bear
most of the brunt of the agency cost of other stakeholders and executives can hold
nontrivial amounts of debt–like instruments. We find strong evidence in support
of RPE in the compensation of top executives. In addition, we cannot reject that
the magnitude of RPE used in the average contract is optimal. Overall, this essay
contributes to the ongoing debate about the efficiency of executive pay.
In the second essay, “Shareholder Bargaining Power, Debt Overhang, and Invest-
ment”, we analyze how shareholder bargaining power affects the underinvestment
problem caused by debt overhang. Using a dynamic model of strategic bargaining
between equity and debt holders following default, we relate firm-specific charac-
teristics, such as the shareholder and bondholder ownership concentration, to debt
overhang and investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find expected liqui-
dation values and bondholder ownership concentration enhance the underinvestment
effect of debt overhang, while shareholder ownership concentration mitigates it. Our
results highlight how shareholder bargaining power in default can affect the under-
investment problem caused by debt overhang.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of two essays that attempt to answer two research
questions in corporate finance. In Section 2, we investigate if there is evidence of
benchmarking in the compensation of top executives of firms. In Section 3, which
is part of a larger research effort from Alanis, Chava, and Kumar (2015), we ask
if potential shareholder bargaining power can affect the underinvestment caused by
debt overhang.
In the first essay, “A New Benchmark: Relative Performance Evaluation with
Total Returns”, we study if large publicly traded U.S. firms benchmark the annual
compensation of their chief executive officers (CEOs). The longstanding hypothesis
of relative performance evaluation (RPE) states that CEO compensation should
exclude the firm performance driven by exogenous common shocks over which the
executive has no control.
Despite the strong theoretical underpinnings of RPE, previous literature has
found little empirical support for it. Contrary to extant literature, in our “pay
for performance” estimates the performance part is the total return of the firm in-
stead of just its equity return. We argue this is a sensible approach since most of
the exogenous common shocks occur at the asset level. We find strong statistical
support for the RPE hypothesis when using total firm return as the performance
metric, suggesting that firms do filter out exogenous shocks from CEO compensa-
tion. Moreover, we cannot reject that the average firm uses RPE in optimal fashion.
While this essay is not a formal test of efficiency in the executive labor market, we
find support for one of the main implications of an efficient executive labor market,
benchmarking in compensation.
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In the second essay, “Shareholder Bargaining Power, Debt Overhang, and Invest-
ment”, we analyze how shareholder bargaining power affects the underinvestment
problem caused by debt overhang. Intuitively, the underinvestment problem due to
risky debt is caused by the truncation of equity holders’ investment horizon at default,
so that shareholders do not fully recognize the returns to investment that outstand-
ing bondholders receive in default. However, if shareholders are able to recover some
of the firm value after default, a common observed fact in U.S. bankruptcies, then
the debt overhang problem may be mitigated.
We build a dynamic model of strategic bargaining between equity and debt hold-
ers following default and we relate firm-specific characteristics, such as the share-
holder and bondholder ownership concentration, to debt overhang and investment.
Our theoretical model generates several empirical predictions, mainly that measures
generally associated with weak shareholder recovery in default (what we term weak
shareholder bargaining power), such as high expected liquidation value or high bond-
holder concentration, should enhance the underinvestment effect of debt overhang;
while proxies of high shareholder power, such as institutional ownership in the share-
holder base, should mitigate the underinvestment. We find broad empirical support
in the data for our theoretical predictions. This essay highlights how shareholder bar-
gaining power in default can affect the investment choices of firms, and contributes
to the ongoing debate about the effects that the structure of bankruptcy proceedings
can have over a firm outside of default.
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2. A NEW BENCHMARK: RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
WITH TOTAL RETURNS
2.1 Introduction to Section 2
One of the main results from agency theory is that compensation of chief executive
officers (CEOs) should be linked to firm performance to motivate effort and maximize
firm value. Moreover, the hypothesis of relative performance evaluation (RPE) states
that the compensation should exclude the firm performance driven by exogenous
common shocks over which the executive has no control. Theoretical arguments
show that the use of RPE leads to more efficient contracts because it allows the
firm to contract over a more precise measure of the agent’s effort and, at the same
time, it lowers the risk faced by the CEO in her compensation (see Holmstro¨m, 1982;
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1987; Pendergast, 1999).
Despite the strong theoretical underpinnings of RPE, prior empirical research
has found little support for it. Abowd and Kaplan (1999) call the weak empirical
evidence in favor of RPE an important puzzle for executive compensation. In this
essay we revisit the question of RPE in CEO compensation under a different metric
of firm performance.
Previous literature on RPE has almost exclusively employed stock returns as the
measure of firm performance and the average return of the industry as instrument for
the exogenous common shock (see the survey of evidence in Murphy, 1999; Abowd
and Kaplan, 1999). We argue that the total return of the firm –or the return on the
firm’s assets– is a better choice to identify the common shock.
Extant theory in RPE assumes that the exogenous shock affects the firm (or
project) at the operating cash flow level (Holmstro¨m, 1982; Holmstro¨m and Milgrom,
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1987). Stock returns, on the other hand, represent levered cash flows. Thus, if a
common shock is experienced at the operating level (for instance a shock to sales or
cost), the stock price reaction to this shock will be affected by the leverage of the
firm. Moreover, Garlappi and Yan (2011) show that the effect of leverage on equity
risk may be nonlinear and could even have different signs depending on the default
risk of the firm. In addition, the stock price reaction to a common shock may also
reflect changes to agency costs, expected distress costs, and financial constraints,
which may also vary with a firm’s capital structure.1
We argue that total firm return –which includes equity returns but also the return
on the firm’s debt– is a better measure of performance in RPE regressions. The total
return provides a better representation of the asset performance of the firm, where
the common shock is assumed to occur. We find strong statistical support for the
RPE hypothesis when using total firm return as the performance metric, suggesting
that firms do filter out exogenous shocks from CEO compensation.
Prior literature has commonly gaged firm performance by its equity return since
the fiduciary duty of a CEO is to her shareholders and, in addition, the average CEO
holds substantial equity–like instruments in her own firm (Murphy, 1999). However,
the agency cost literature suggest that shareholders ultimately bear the agency costs
suffered by other stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Based on this agency
cost argument, Edmans and Liu (2011) note that it appears intuitive that companies
should pay managers according to firm value, rather than equity value alone. In the
same vein, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) ask “why does compensation design meant
to maximize total firm value have managers paid in stocks rather than as a function
of total firm value, even when well–functioning debt markets exist?” [p.1027].
1Bernanke and Gertler (1989) demonstrate that business cycle shocks can enhance or mitigate
agency costs, while Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that less financially constrained firms are
better able to respond to external shocks.
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Further, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) show that executives are not compen-
sated exclusively with cash and equity–like instruments, but rather they hold non-
trivial amounts of inside debt.2 Thus, it also seems plausible that executives with
large inside debt stakes will care not only about the equity return of their firm but
rather about its total return.
In this essay we obtain an estimate of the total return of a firm in two ways.
First, we calibrate the structural model of firm value from Merton (1974) to obtain
an estimate of the total firm return. This model from Merton (1974) has been used
extensively in the credit risk literature to obtain default probability estimates (see
Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Chava and Purnanandam,
2010). We use the calibration procedure of Vassalou and Xing (2004) in order to
back out of the model the annualized total return on the firm’s assets.
A second way we obtain the total return on the firm is by using actual bond
prices from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database. For a
small sample of firms we are able to obtain market returns on their publicly traded
corporate bonds, and by assuming that the firm’s debt return is the same as its
return on public bonds, we obtain an estimate of total firm return based on market
prices.
Once we have an estimate of total returns, we follow previous literature and use
a firm’s industry affiliation as its peer group exposed to the same common shocks
(see Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Janakiraman, Lambert, and
Larcker, 1992; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a). The average performance of this peer
group (we exclude the own firm in this average) represents the common exogenous
shocks suffered by the industry. The average total return of the industry is closer to
2Edmans and Liu (2011) define inside debt as pensions and any type of deferred compensation
in which the executive has equal priority with other creditors in the event of bankruptcy.
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the exogenous shocks analyzed in the theoretical literature of RPE since it represents
the return on the operating assets.
We obtain CEO compensation data from 1992 to 2012 from Execucomp and
estimate the sensitivity of the annual compensation flow to firm and industry total
return, controlling for firm and CEO characteristics plus year and executive dummies.
As expected, we find that compensation is positively related to the firm’s total return,
but importantly, we find that compensation is negatively related to the industry total
return. This is exactly what the RPE theory states, the common shock in the firm’s
performance is filtered out of compensation. Our findings are robust to using total
returns from the calibrated Merton (1974) model or the ones obtained with actual
bond prices, despite the different sample size.
Moreover, we test if the amount of filtering is optimal. Under some distributional
assumptions, Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) and Banker and Datar (1989) derive
the optimal ratio of industry to firm performance sensitivity that should exist in
an efficient contract under RPE. Intuitively, the more correlated that the firm and
industry performance are, the more filtering should occur in compensation.
We test for this optimal use of RPE in our regressions and we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that firms are using RPE in optimal fashion in CEO compensation.3
We believe this represents an important result since, to our knowledge, we are the
first study to show evidence in support of optimal use of RPE in the compensation
of CEOs.
We show that our main findings are robust to several potential issues. We obtain
qualitatively similar results when we estimate firm–specific regressions which allow
pay sensitivities to differ across firms in our sample. Our results continue to hold for
3This test is also as the strong–form test of RPE (Antle and Smith, 1986). It is mostly absent
from the empirical literature since most studies fail to find that even some filtering is occurring.
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the most part when we consider different industry definitions used in the literature,
or when we use different weighting schemes to construct industry performance. As
well, we find suggestive (though not statistically significant) evidence of RPE when
we use a small sample of executive compensation data from 1963 to 1991.4 Further,
we show our results are robust to the enactment of accounting rule FAS 123R in 2006
which changed the way firms expense equity–like awards and increased disclosure
requirements on compensation.
We also investigate the robustness of our results in two settings that challenge the
use of RPE. A key condition of RPE is that the agent cannot influence the output of
her peer group, which is likely violated in less competitive industries where firms re-
spond to strategic actions taken by their peers. As in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b)
we use the Herfindahl index of market share as a measure of industry competition
and we find some weak evidence that less competitive industries use lower amounts
of RPE in CEO compensation, though the regression estimates are only marginally
statistically significant.
In addition, we test if industries with high strategic flexibility make less use of
RPE. Galopan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) argue that in these type of industries
CEOs can choose the level of exposure of their firm to the common shock even in
the short run, violating again a key assumption of RPE. When we restrict our tests
to industries with high strategic flexibility –high market to book ratio and high
R&D spending– our main findings remain qualitatively unchanged, as we do not find
evidence of less use of RPE in these setting.
Overall, our paper contributes to the recent discussion about the efficiency of
CEO contracting. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Bebchuk and Fried (2004),
4This dataset is a subset of the one used by Frydman and Saks (2010), who hand collect it to
show that some of the stylized facts observed in compensation since the 1980s may not be present
in earlier decades.
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and Garvey and Milbourn (2006) suggest that executives enjoy some level of capture
over the compensation process, while Gabaix and Landier (2008) show that the
rise of executive compensation can be explained within a framework of competitive
markets and rare skills. Our contribution is to show that one of the main implications
of the principal–agent model, that of relative performance evaluation, seems to be
supported by the data. This finding is in line with the view that, in this respect, pay
in the CEO labor market is set competitively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the empirical
methodology and data used in our analysis, including a detailed description of how
we compute total firm returns. Section 2.3 contains our main findings, while section
2.4 investigates the robustness of these findings to several potential issues. The final
section provides some concluding remarks.
2.2 Methodology
Baker and Hall (2004) argue that the correct empirical specification relating com-
pensation to firm performance depends on what drives CEO incentives, whether it
is dollar or fractional ownership in the firm.
Previous literature measures firm performance in two different ways, as the annual
percentage return or as the annual change in total shareholder wealth (the stock
return multiplied by the start of period market capitalization). Hall and Liebman
(1998) and Baker and Hall (2004) argue that if CEO incentives increase with CEO
dollar ownership, then percentage returns are the correct performance metric. If,
instead, CEO incentives are driven by the executive’s fractional ownership, then
performance should be specified in dollar terms.
Murphy (1999) shows that regressing levels of compensation against stock returns
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is the correct specification when CEO incentives respond to dollar ownership; on
the other hand, if CEO incentives are driven by fractional ownership, the correct
empirical model is to regress changes in compensation to stock returns.
We make no claim as to the correct measure of performance and instead use both
specifications. When the driver of CEO incentives are her dollar amount stake in the
company, the correct regression specification is in levels of compensation,
Log(Pay)it = ηt + δi + α1Firm Performanceit + α2Industry Performanceit
+ β1Firm Controlsit−1 + β2CEO Controlsit + εit (2.1)
When the driver of CEO incentives are her fractional ownership of the company,
the correct regression specification is in changes of compensation,
∆Log(Pay)it = ηt + δi + α1Firm Performanceit + α2Industry Performanceit
+ β1∆Firm Controlsit−1 + β2CEO Controlsit + ξit (2.2)
The intuition behind these regressions is that CEO pay should be related to the
idiosyncratic part of Firm Performance but the common shocks –over which the
agent has no control– should be filtered out of the compensation flow. The Industry
Performance measure reflects the common shocks to the industry plus additional
noise, thus this second term serves to filter out the common shocks from the com-
pensation package.
We conduct two tests of RPE: a weak–form version that tests if at least some
of the common shock is filtered out of compensation, and the strong–form test that
examines if the level of RPE in the contract is optimal.
The weak–form version of RPE tests the null hypothesis H0 : α2 ≥ 0 against
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the alternative HA : α2 < 0. This is known as the weak–form because rejection of
the null implies that some of the common shocks affecting performance are removed
from CEO compensation, but it may or may not be the optimal amount.
Under certain distributional assumptions5, Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) and
Banker and Datar (1989) show that there exists an optimal level of RPE which trades
off incentives, risk–sharing, and the information of common shocks contained in the
industry performance measure. This test is known as the strong–form version of RPE,
where the null hypothesis is H0 : α2/α1 = − cov(Firm Performance,Industry Performance)var(Industry Performance)
and the alternative one is HA : α2/α1 6= − cov(Firm Performance,Industry Performance)var(Industry Performance) .
This test is well defined only if α1 is different from zero, otherwise the ratio of pay
sensitivities of industry and firm performance is not defined.
If the test fails to reject the null, it provides evidence, under the model of Holm-
stro¨m and Milgrom (1987), that the common shock in performance is completely
removed and the CEO is evaluated solely on the basis of her idiosyncratic perfor-
mance.
We include year fixed effects in equations (2.1) and (2.2) to account for potential
time trends in compensation. Following Graham, Li, and Qiu (2011) we also include
executive fixed effects to control for potentially unobserved CEO characteristics such
as managerial style and risk preferences. As Albuquerque (2009), we control for firm
size by the Log of assets and Log of sales, we also include the Market to book ratio of
assets to control for growth opportunities, we use book Leverage and the annualized
standard deviation of daily stock returns (Stock volatility) to account for firm risk,
we control for profitability with the Return on assets, and for Institutional ownership
with the percent of shares outstanding held by the top five institutional investors.
5These are the assumptions behind the LEN model: linear sharing rule, exponential utility, and
normal distributed errors.
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We control for executive characteristics with CEO tenure in years, the Log of
CEO age –if missing we set it at zero and include a dummy for missing values–,
we also include a CEO chair dummy equal to one if the CEO serves also as the
chairman of the board of directors, and Interlock dummy equal to one if the CEO
has an interlock relationship with a board member, and a CEO ownership dummy if
the executive holds more than 5% of outstanding shares in the company (changing
the cutoff value to 2% or 7.5% does not affect out results).
2.2.1 Data sources
We obtain data on CEO compensation from Execucomp for years 1992 to 2012.
We merge compensation data with accounting information from Compustat and
stock price information from CRSP. We require firms to have positive total assets
and sales, as well as nonmissing stock return information. Further, we exclude ob-
servations for which there are more than one CEO or the executive was in the firm
for less than a year, and also when the CEO owns more than 30% of all outstanding
shares in the company.6 We deflate all dollar values with the Consumer Price Index
obtained from the Federal Reserve’s FRED database.
For ease of comparison with previous literature we classify a firm’s industry af-
filiation by the first two digits of its Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system.
In robustness tests we also use the Fama–French 49 industries, the three digit North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the six digit Global Industry
Classification System (GICS), and the 100 fixed industry classification from Hoberg
and Phillips (2010).
We screen regulated utilities (SIC between 4900 and 4949) and public administra-
6 Results are unaffected by changing the cutoff value to 25% or 50% of all outstanding shares.
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tion and government entities (SIC above 9000) since compensation and performance
in these type of firms may suffer from different regulations and oversight.
We measure annual total compensation with Execucomp item tdc1. Starting with
2006 accounting rule FAS 123R modified the way option compensation is reported,
thus to obtain a consistent time series we adjust for the reporting change following
Kini and Williams (2011) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014). In robustness tests,
we cutoff the sample in 2005 to avoid the impact of FAS 123R and find qualitatively
similar results. Since annual compensation is highly skewed we take the log value.
As Albuquerque (2009), we do not include changes in the value of existing firm
options and stock holdings owned by the CEO. The revaluation of these previously
granted securities is mechanically related to the firm’s performance and thus inde-
pendent of relative output (see Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998;
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a). The annual compensation flow will understate the
true incentives faced by the CEO, since the latter include all CEO wealth that fluc-
tuates with firm output.
We use two performace metrics: equity return and total firm return. We measure
the annual equity return of a firm as the monthly compounded stock return including
dividends. Total firm return is the market return on the firm’s assets, we obtain this
measure from a calibrated Merton (1974) model and also by combining equity returns
with observed corporate bond returns from TRACE. In the following subsection we
explain in detail the procedure to obtain total firm returns.
For each firm we compute industry performance as the market capitalization
weighted average of all other firms with the same two digit SIC industry classification
excluding the firm. We require at least other three firms in the same industry to
compute peer performance for a firm–year.
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2.2.2 Total firm return
The total annual return of the firm is the weighted sum of the equity return
plus its debt return where the weight is the firm’s debt to market equity ratio.
Unfortunately, market values of total debt are not readily observable for most firms.
Hence, we estimate total firm return in two different ways.
First, we calibrate the credit risk model of Merton (1974) following Vassalou and
Xing (2004) and Bharath and Shumway (2008). Merton (1974) views the value of
equity in a firm as a call option on the firm’s assets, where the strike price of the
option is the firm’s debt. This model has been used extensively in the default risk
literature (see Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Chava and
Purnanandam, 2010).
Given the assumption that firm value follows a geometric Brownian motion, Vas-
salou and Xing (2004) use an iterative procedure to calibrate the model. We follow
the same iterative algorithm to back out the market value of the firm’s assets and
their annual return.
Using the calibrated Merton (1974) model to back out firm value has the benefit
that it is possible to obtain for a broad sample of firms with a long time series. How-
ever, the cost of this method is that it does not represent true market information
and the results may be overly sensitive to the calibration parameters. As an alter-
native, we obtain bond transaction data from TRACE and compute bond returns
from actual market prices.
Starting in 2002 TRACE collects individual bond transaction information and
beginning in 2005 coverage is considered virtually all publicly traded bonds in the
U.S. (see Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu, 2009). We merge price data from
TRACE with bond information from Mergent’s FISD to obtain a comprehensive
13
database of all bond transactions of U.S. corporate bonds from 2002 to 2012.
We keep all non–asset backed, nonconvertible, nonputable bonds with fixed coupon
rate. Since most bonds do not trade on a daily basis, to compute the annual return
over the fiscal year we choose the transactions closest to the start and end of the
fiscal year around a 30 day window and compute the bond return as the change in
clean price plus the accrued interest payments.7 For firms with multiple bonds we
compute the weighted average return where the weight is the market value of the
bond at the start of the year.
Since we obtain data only for corporate public bonds, we assume that the debt
return of a firm is the same as the bond return obtained from TRACE. Finally, we
estimate the total firm return as the weighted average of the equity and debt return
where the weights are the market value of equity and book value of debt, respectively.
This second alternative has the benefit of providing a true market return for a
component of the firm’s debt. The downside of using bond prices is a much smaller
sample with a shorter time series, and we must assume that all of the firm’s debt
has the same return as its public bonds.
2.2.3 Descriptive statistics
The final sample consists of 24,207 firm–year observations for 2,525 unique firms
and 4,774 different CEOs. Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the main vari-
ables used in the paper. All dollar values are deflated by the Consumer Price Index.
The median CEO in our sample receives annual real flow compensation of $1.27
million, we can observe that compensation is very skewed, with the median being
roughly half of the mean. For this reason we use the log of compensation as dependent
7 Choosing instead a 15 or 10 day window does not alter the results.
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variables in our regressions. In over half of all observations the CEO is also the
chairman of the board of directors and has been the company’s top executive for
about 5.5 years. In 13% of our firm–years the CEO holds over 5% of the outstanding
shares of the firm, which suggests the possibility of entrenchment.
The median firm in our sample is medium to large with sales of over half a
billion in real dollars and moderately levered at 20%. Most firm–years in our sample
are generating profits with positive return on assets even at the first quartile of
the distribution. The median stock return is 8.4% while the median total return is
slightly lower at 5.6%, this is natural since shareholders have a levered position on
the firm’s assets. Overall, our sample looks similar to that of previous studies of RPE
on executive compensation such as Albuquerque (2009) and Galopan, Milbourn, and
Song (2010).
Table 2.2 presents Pearson correlations between our measures of compensation
and performance. The level of compensation has a very small positive correlation
with firm performance measures and a slightly negative one with industry perfor-
mance. The change in compensation has stronger positive correlations with firm
returns but also industry performance.
The correlation between firm equity return and firm total return is very high
(0.81), which is to be expected since the difference between these two is the return
on debt, and as seen on Table 2.1 the leverage ratio is moderate for the average
firm in the sample. We can also note that the correlation between firm and industry
performance is roughly the same for equity and total firm returns.
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2.3 Results
We first test for RPE in the levels of CEO compensation. This is the correct
empirical specification if incentives are driven by dollar ownership. Table 2.3 presents
the estimation results from equation (2.1) when we classify peer groups by the firm’s
two digit SIC industry classification. The industry return variable represents shocks
common to all firms in the same industry, thus a negative coefficient on this variable
suggests that firms filter out part of these shocks from the compensation contract of
CEOs.
In model 1 we test for RPE using equity returns. Results are consistent with
previous literature where we observe a positive and statistically significant association
between the firm’s equity return and CEO annual compensation, but a statistically
insignificant association between industry return and compensation.
In model 2 we use the firm’s total return, obtained from the calibrated Merton
(1974) model, as the performance metric. We observe that the firm’s total return is
positive and statistically significant while the industry total return is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with weak–form RPE.
As suggested by Graham, Li, and Qiu (2011), models 1 and 2 include executive
dummies to control for potential time–invariant unobserved characteristics. In model
3 we include firm dummies instead, to control for potential invariant omitted variables
at the firm level, results are mostly unaffected as we still observe a positive impact
from the firm’s total return and a negative coefficient for the industry total return.
In model 4 we perform an additional check to our specification. We argue that the
industry total return presents a better measure of the exogenous common shock to the
industry, and, based on RPE, this shock should not factor in CEO compensation. In
models 2 and 3, the impact of the industry total return on compensation is negative
18
because the firm total return already includes the common shock and is positively
associated to compensation.
In model 4, we estimate our regression including only the industry total return;
since we exclude the firm return, we expect the common shock to have no effect on
compensation. This is indeed what we observe. The point estimate of the indus-
try total return is very small and not statistically significant, suggesting that the
exogenous common shock to the industry is not associated with compensation.8
In panel B of Table 2.3 we if the level of RPE observed in the regression is
consistent with the optimal level of RPE suggested by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1987). As mentioned above, finding that part of the common shocks are filtered out
of compensation is not sufficient evidence that firms make optimal use of relative
performance. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) show that the optimal level of RPE
is when α2/α1 = − cov(Firm Performance,Industry Performance)var(Industry Performance) , this test is also known as
the strong form version of RPE (see Antle and Smith, 1986).
In panel B we present the results from a Wald test where the null hypothesis
is that of the optimal use of RPE. For model 1 the test is not informative since,
as shown above, for equity returns there is no RPE even in weak form. When we
use total returns as the performance metric in models 2 and 3 we observe that the
Wald test fails to reject the optimal level of RPE even at the 10% significance level.
This finding suggests that firms not only filter some of the common shocks out of
compensation, but that they filter these shocks in an optimal way.
We next test for RPE using changes in the annual compensation; this is the
correct empirical specification when the CEO’s incentives for effort are driven by her
8It is important to be careful when interpreting results from this regression since, by excluding
the firm return, we have created an omitted variable bias in the specification. Given the positive
correlation between the firm and industry total return observed in Table 2.2 and the positive
coefficient of the firm return in models 2 and 3, the point estimate for the industry return is biased
upward. We view the evidence of this regression as merely suggestive.
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fractional ownership in the firm.
Table 2.4 presents regression estimates of equation (2.2) when, again, a firm’s
peer group is defined by all other firms in the same two digit SIC industry. Results
are broadly consistent with Table 2.3. In model 1 we observe that changes in CEO
compensation are positively associated with her firm’s equity return, but the impact
of the industry equity return is not statistically significant.
Model 2 uses instead the total firm return and we find evidence in support of
RPE; the point estimate on the industry total return is negatively and statistically
significant at the 1% level. Point estimates are in line with previous studies of the
impact of performance on pay. Murphy (1999) finds that the pay–performance semi–
elasticity using equity returns vary between 0.09 and 0.26, which is similar to our
estimated magnitudes.
In model 4 we again estimate our regression excluding the firm total return, so
as to estimate the standalone impact of the common shock. We again stress that
the results from this regression are merely suggestive since it suffers from an omitted
variable bias by not including the firm return in the specification. As in Table 2.3,
we observe that the point estimate of the industry total return is very small and
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the common industry shock by itself is not
affecting compensation.
In panel B we present results for a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the
amount of RPE is optimal in the sense of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987). For model
1, which uses equity returns as the performance metric, the test is uninformative since
the regression estimates suggest there is no RPE in this case. For models 2 and 3,
which use total return as the performance metric, we find support for the strong
form version of RPE. In model 2, which contains CEO dummies, we fail to reject
the null of optimal use of RPE at the 10% level, while in model 3, which uses firm
21
dummies, we fail to reject the null at a 5% confidence level.
Overall, we find strong statistical evidence in favor of RPE in both empirical
specifications. Further, for both specifications we cannot reject that the level of
RPE is optimal in the sense of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987).
2.3.1 Firm return from observed bond prices
In the previous section our estimates of total returns are obtained from calibrating
the Merton (1974) model. This method makes it possible to obtain total returns for
large sample of firms; however, this does not represent true market information and
it is possible results could be overly sensitive to the calibration procedure. In this
section we check the robustness of our results by using market prices for a firm’s debt
to obtain an estimate of total return.
As explained in section 2.2.2, we use bond prices from TRACE to construct an
estimate of a firm’s total return which is based on observed market prices of equity
and debt. Unfortunately, using bond prices from TRACE reduces drastically our
sample. We are able to use observations from 2002 onward and only for firms with
traded corporate bonds in TRACE.9 In this case, our sample consists of 4,010 firm–
year observations for 950 unique firms and 1,297 distinct executives.
Table 2.5 presents regression results with this alternate estimation of total returns.
In model 1 we use the empirical specification with the level of annual compensation
while in model 2 we use the change in compensation. Unsurprisingly, for both spec-
ifications we find a positive and statistically strong association between the firm’s
total return and the annual CEO compensation. More importantly, despite the small
sample size we find evidence in support of RPE. For the specification in levels, the
9We also keep all firm–years with no debt in their capital structure since in this case the equity
return is the total return.
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coefficient on the industry total return is negative and statically significant, albeit
only at the 10% level; for the changes regression in model 2 we find a negative co-
efficient statistically significant at the 1% level. The economic magnitude of the
coefficients is about half of that in Table 2.3 when use the levels of compensation
and very similar to Table 2.4 when we use specify the changes in compensation.
We again test for the strong form version of RPE in Panel B of Table 2.5 and in
both cases we find evidence in favor of the optimal use of RPE. For both specifications
we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of optimal RPE at the 10% level.
While using observed bond prices to compute total returns creates its own chal-
lenges, we believe results in Table 2.5 alleviate concerns regarding the sensitivity of
our main findings to the calibration of the Merton (1974) model.
2.3.2 Firm–specific regressions
Our results so far are based on pooled regressions controlling for executive and
year dummies. One critical assumption we make is that of constant coefficients
across time and firms. Though this is a common assumption in the literature, it
seems plausible that the sensitivity of compensation to performance could vary by
firm or by industry. Some of the early empirical literature on RPE (Antle and Smith,
1986; Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker, 1992) use only time series tests for this
reason.
In Table 2.6 we estimate the impact of total returns on compensation using firm–
specific time series regressions. We require firms to have at least 8 observations to be
included in this test, and given the small sample size the only explanatory variables
included in the regression are the firm and industry total return, and the log of total
assets. A total of 1,322 firms satisfy our requirement of at least 8 observations.
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Table 2.5: Market value from observed bond prices
In this table we use observed annual bond returns from TRACE to construct total return from
market prices. We estimate the equation Log(Payit) = δt + ηj + α1Firm Total Returnit +
α2Industry Total Returnit + β
′Control V ariablesit + ξit. For each firm, industry per-
formance is the market capitalization–weighted average performance of all other avail-
able firms with the same 2 digit SIC industry classification. Panel B presents a Wald
test for the strong form version of RPE where the null hypothesis is H0 : α2/α1 =
−cov(Firm Total Return, Industry Total Return)/var(Industry Total Return). The sample
spans from 2002 to 2012. Variable definitions are presented in Table 2.1. Heteroskedasticity robust
t–statistics clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and *, indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Log(Pay) ∆ Log(Pay)
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Firm Total Return 0.141*** (3.37) 0.352*** (3.57)
Industry Total Return -0.073* (-1.80) -0.202*** (-2.62)
Log of assets 0.314*** (3.70)
Log of sales -0.013 (-0.17)
Market to book ratio 0.082*** (3.38)
Leverage 0.048 (0.19)
Return on assets 0.388 (1.51)
Institutional ownership 0.071 (0.30)
Stock Volatility -0.151 (-1.17)
CEO ownership dummy -0.086 (-0.70) -0.240 (-1.25)
CEO chair dummy -0.001 (-0.02) 0.004 (0.05)
CEO tenure 0.002 (0.06) 0.052 (0.62)
Log of CEO age 1.418** (2.50) 1.657 (1.28)
Missing Age dummy 5.601** (2.49) 6.552 (1.27)
Interlock dummy -0.077 (-0.31) -0.151 (-0.80)
∆ Log of assets 0.073 (0.35)
∆ Log of sales -0.081 (-0.49)
∆ Market to book ratio 0.078*** (2.89)
∆ Leverage 0.420 (0.74)
∆ Return on assets -0.017 (-0.04)
∆ Institutional ownership -0.213 (-0.54)
∆ Stock Volatility -0.080 (-0.47)
Year dummies Yes Yes
CEO dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.32 0.01
Observations 4,010 3,230
Panel B: Strong Form RPE Test
F statistic 0.04 0.00
p–value 0.83 0.99
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Table 2.6 presents summary statistics of the estimated coefficients across the
firm–specific regressions, the last column in the table presents the test statistic of
the null hypothesis that the mean coefficient is zero. In panel A we present results
for levels of annual compensation while in panel B we use the changes in annual
compensation. We find strong statistical evidence in favor of RPE in both empirical
specifications, the mean and median of industry total return coefficients are negative
and in both panels the test that the mean coefficient is zero is strongly rejected.
Table 2.6: Firm–specific regressions
This table presents summary statistics for the coefficients of RPE regressions esti-
mated separately for each firm in our sample. We require that a firm have at least 8
observations to be included in the estimation. In Panel A the dependent variable in
the estimation is Log(Pay) while in Panel B the dependent variable is ∆Log(Pay).
The only explanatory variables included in the regression are a constant, Firm Total
Return, Industry Total Return, and Log of Assets. For each firm, Industry Total
Return is the market capitalization–weighted average of all other available firms with
the same 2 digit SIC industry classification. The Strong RPE Statistic is the differ-
ence within each firm regression of the ratio of the coefficients of industry to firm
total return minus the ratio of the covariance of these two variables to the variance
of the industry total return.
Mean Median Std. Dev. N t-value
Panel A: Dependent variable is Log(Pay)
Firm Total Return 0.28 0.24 0.96 1,322 10.62
Industry Total Return -0.22 -0.21 1.80 1,322 4.51
Strong RPE Statistic 0.06 -0.05 31.25 1,322 0.07
Panel B: Dependent variable is ∆Log(Pay)
Firm Total Return 0.48 0.39 2.31 1,322 7.55
Industry Total Return -0.31 -0.15 4.44 1,322 2.53
Strong RPE Statistic -1.30 0.07 112.09 1,322 0.42
Given the small sample size of each firm–specific regression, it does not seem
very fruitful to conduct a Wald test of optimal RPE for each regression. Instead, we
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follow Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992) and construct a strong form RPE
quantity for each regression and then test if the mean of this quantity is different
from zero. We compute this strong form RPE quantity as the ratio of the industry to
firm total return coefficients minus the ratio of the firm–specific covariance between
firm and industry performance to the firm–specific variance of industry total return.
The third row in each panel presents summary statistics for this strong form RPE
quantity. We find evidence in support of optimal RPE in the annual compensation
flow. For both empirical specifications the median is very close to zero, and in the
last column we see that we cannot reject the test that the mean quantity is different
from zero even at the 10% level.
2.3.3 Alternate test of strong–form RPE
Antle and Smith (1986) devise an alternate test of strong–form RPE by noting
that an implication of filtering out common shocks is that executives should be
compensated only for the unsystematic (or idiosyncratic) part of firm performance.
By definition, the unsystematic performance of the firm is unrelated to that of its
peer group. Thus, Antle and Smith (1986) propose to regress firm on industry per-
formance and use the residuals and predicted values of this regression as an estimate
of unsystematic and systematic firm performance, respectively.
We follow Antle and Smith (1986) to obtain the systematic and unsystematic
components of firm performance and then estimate the impact of each part on CEO
compensation in the following equation,
27
Log(Pay)it = ηt + δi + γ1Systematic Performanceit
+ γ2Unsystematic Performanceit + β1Firm Controlsit−1
+ β2CEO Controlsit + εit (2.3)
If γ1 = 0 in the equation above, then executives are not being compensated for
the systematic (or common) part of firm performance. Hence, a test of the null
hypothesis H0 : γ1 = 0 amounts to a test of strong–form RPE.
Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)
and Garvey and Milbourn (2006) estimate models similar to equation (2.3) and
all fail to find evidence in support of strong–form RPE when the measure of firm
performance are equity returns.
We estimate equation (2.3) in levels and changes of annual compensation flow
for both equity and total firm returns as measures of firm performance. Table 2.7
contains the regression results. We observe that the systematic portion of equity re-
turns has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in both levels and changes
of compensation, which is a forceful rejection of the strong–form RPE hypothesis.
This result is similar to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Mil-
bourn (2006), who call it “pay for luck” since executives are being compensated on
a systematic shock over which they have no control.
In models 2 and 4 we use total return as the measure of performance and now
results support the strong–form RPE hypothesis. For both levels and changes of
annual compensation, only the coefficient for the unsystematic portion of the firm’s
total return is statistically significant. This suggests that CEOs are not being com-
pensated for the systematic (or common) part of performance, instead they are being
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evaluated only on the unsystematic portion of performance.
The results in Table 2.7 are in agreement with the findings from the Wald tests
in panel B of Tables 2.3 and 2.4, which provide evidence in support of the use of
optimal levels of RPE in executive compensation contracts.
2.4 Robustness
In this section we explore the robustness of our main findings to different sources
of concern. First, we have defined industry affiliation by a firm’s first two digit
SIC classification, but it remains an open question if SIC codes are truly effective
at industry grouping considering there exist several different industry classification
schemes. Second, recent evidence by Frydman and Saks (2010) shows that execu-
tive compensation has suffered dramatic changes through the years and some of the
stylized facts of compensation of the past thirty years are not observed in previous
decades, thus it is possible that our findings about the use of RPE are only a recent
phenomenon.
Third, we study if governance affects RPE practices. Bebchuk and Fried (2004),
among others, have argued that chief executives enjoy some level of capture over
board of directors and are thus able to set their pay in noncompetitive fashion.
Fourth, we test if our results hold in industries considered to have high strategic
flexibility, where the CEO can choose the level of exposure of her firm to the in-
dustry shock. Lastly, a key condition of RPE is that the agent cannot influence the
output of her peer group, an assumption likely to be violated in less competitive
industries where firms respond to strategic actions taken by their competitors. We
next explore the robustness of our results to all these possible issues.
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2.4.1 Different industry benchmarks
Previous literature on RPE commonly defines a firm’s peer group by its SIC
industry classification (Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Janaki-
raman, Lambert, and Larcker, 1992; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a), however, there
exist different classification schemes which may be used instead and it remains an
open question which one is superior.
Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003) compare different industry classification schemes
and conclude that SIC, NAICS, and the Fama–French industries all share a high
degree of correspondence among them, but they argue that the GICS scheme is
preferable since it can explain a greater proportion of the cross–sectional variation in
firm level returns. On the other hand, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) argue that fixed
industry classifications ignore product differentiation, asset complementarities, etc.
and argue that industry groups based on a text analysis of firms’ annual statements
are superior.
We take no stand as to which industry classification is superior, instead we show
our results with all these alternative schemes. In Table 2.8 we use the Fama–French
49 industries, the first three digits of a firm’s NAICS classification, the first 6 digits
of its GICS scheme, and the 100 Hoberg–Phillips industries.10 We use both empirical
specifications, levels and changes of annual compensation, with all industry classi-
fications and for the sake of brevity we omit the point estimates for all firm and
executive control variables though they are included in the estimation.
Results in Table 2.8 are broadly in support of our main findings. In all cases
a firm’s total return is positively correlated with annual compensation, while the
10We obtain the Fama–French classification from professor French’s website (http://mba.tuck.
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html) and the Hoberg–Phillips in-
dustries from their data depository (http://alex2.umd.edu/industrydata/).
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industry total return is negatively associated. When the specification used is in
levels of compensation all point estimates are statistically significant at at least the
5% level; when we use changes in compensation we find strong statistical significance
for the Fama–French and NAICS classification but the negative coefficients for the
GICS and Hoberg–Phillips industry total returns are no longer statistically significant
at conventional levels.
In panel B of Table 2.8 we conduct a Wald test for the null hypothesis of optimal
use of RPE. For the estimation in levels of compensation, we fail to reject the null
of strong form RPE for all industry groupings at least at the 5% significance level.
The Wald test is more mixed for the case of changes in compensation, we still cannot
reject the null hypothesis for the 3 digit NAICS at the 10% level, but for the Fama–
French and Hoberg–Phillips we only fail to reject the test at the 1% level, and for
the GICS industry scheme the null is rejected at conventional levels.
Overall, our results in this section with alternative industry definitions are in
broad agreement with our main findings that firms filter some common shocks out
of the compensation contract of executives. We also find evidence in support of the
optimal use of RPE by firms, though for some industry groupings the evidence is not
overwhelming.
2.4.2 Different time period
Frydman and Saks (2010) construct a long time series of executive compensation
dating back to the 1930s and show that compensation has suffered dramatic changes
through the years. In their sample, some of the stylized facts of compensation ob-
served in the past thirty years, such as the high correlation between firm size and
compensation, are not observed in prior decades.
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It is possible that our main findings on the use of relative performance evaluation
in compensation contracts only applies to our sample period of 1992–2012. In this
section we investigate this possibility by estimating our equations (2.1) and (2.2) on
the sample of CEO compensation from Frydman and Saks (2010).11 Given that we
need to calibrate the Merton (1974) model to obtain the total return, we are only able
to use observations from 1963 to 1991. Moreover, some of the control variables used
in our regressions –such as institutional ownership and some CEO characteristics–
are not available for this time period, thus we have to use a smaller subset of control
variables though we still include year and CEO dummies.
Table 2.9 present regression estimates for both empirical specifications. Our sam-
ple size is small, with 2,151 firm–years for 105 unique firms and 432 distinct CEOs.
In model 1, estimated on the levels of compensation, we do not obtain significant
results; the firm’s total return is has a positive coefficient but it is not statistically
significant while the industry total return has a positive estimate, inconsistent with
RPE, though it is not statistically significant.
In model 2 we estimate the impact of total return on the changes in compensa-
tion, and results are suggestive of some RPE. The firm’s total return is significantly
associated with changes in compensation, and the industry total return has the cor-
rect negative sign though it is marginally insignificant. Given the limited number of
observations, it is possible that the lack of statistical significance may be due to a
low power issue, though we are not able to ascertain if this is really the case.
11We thank professor Frydman for making this dataset available on her website (https://dl.
dropboxusercontent.com/u/7804692/Website/page.htm).
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Table 2.9: Robustness, different time period
In this table we analyze the use of RPE in a different time period. We
estimate the equation Log(Payit) = δt + ηj + α1Firm Total Returnit +
α2Industry Total Returnit + β
′Control V ariablesit + ξit. For each firm, indus-
try total return is the market capitalization–weighted average of all other available
firms with the same 2 digit SIC industry classification. Panel B presents a Wald
test for the strong form version of RPE where the null hypothesis is H0 : α2/α1 =
−cov(Firm Total Return, Industry Total Return)/var(Industry Total Return).
The sample spans from 1963 to 1991. Variable definitions are presented in Table 2.1.
Heteroskedasticity robust t–statistics clustered at the firm level are in parentheses.
The superscripts ***, **, and *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Dependent Variable: Log(Pay) ∆ Log(Pay)
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Firm Total Return 0.068 (1.09) 0.196** (2.24)
Industry Total Return 0.020 (0.22) -0.191 (-1.60)
Log of assets 0.226 (1.65)
Log of sales 0.007 (0.06)
Market to book ratio -0.015 (-0.30)
Leverage -0.062 (-0.29)
Return on Assets 2.141*** (4.12)
Stock Volatility -0.200 (-1.20)
CEO chair dummy 0.116*** (3.54) 0.092** (2.48)
∆ Log of assets 0.385** (1.99)
∆ Log of sales -0.216 (-1.28)
∆ Market to book ratio 0.003 (0.07)
∆ Leverage 0.073 (0.23)
∆ Return on assets 0.915 (1.65)
∆ Stock Volatility -0.248 (-1.15)
Year dummies Yes Yes
CEO dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.40 0.04
Observations 2,151 1,908
Panel B: Strong Form RPE Test
F statistic 0.84 0.07
p–value 0.36 0.79
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2.4.3 Governance and RPE
Previous studies argue that executives may capture the board of directors and
in effect set their own pay (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker, 1999). Entrenched CEOs and executives of firms with weak governance
could influence their compensation structure away from benchmarking and towards
pay without performance. We test this possibility by using a measure of board
capture.
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) argue that CEOs can exert considerable influ-
ence in the selection of board members, thus directors that began their tenure at
the company after the chief executive is in place may be more sympathetic to the
CEO and provide weaker governance mechanisms; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014)
present empirical evidence in support of their view. We use their measure of board
co–option to test the impact of governance on RPE practice, where board co–option
is the percent of directors hired by the company after the CEO began her tenure.
We enhance equations (2.1) and (2.2) to include board co–option and also its
interaction with industry total returns. If firms with weak governance do not follow
RPE, we expect the interaction term between industry returns and board co–option
to be positive, so that more co–opted boards use less RPE in their CEO compensa-
tion.
In addition, we allow the impact of board co–option on industry total returns to
differ for years when the industry return is positive from when it is negative. Garvey
and Milbourn (2006) argue that if CEOs truly control their compensation process
they will choose to use RPE asymmetrically, that is, CEO pay will be benchmarked
when the industry return is negative but not when it is positive.
Table 2.10 presents regression results. In models 1 we test for the impact of
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board co–option on industry total returns for the level of compensation. We observe
that the impact of board co–option on the level of compensation is positive and
statistically significant, matching the result of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014).
The coefficient for the interaction of co–option and industry total return, though
positive, is not statistically significant. In model 2 we allow for a different impact
depending on whether the industry total return is positive or negative, however,
none of the estimates are statistically significant. In models 3 and 4 we repeat the
same analysis for the change in compensation flow and find similar results where
the interaction between industry total return and board co–option is not significant.
These results suggest that our main findings are not affected by the governance
structure of the firm.
In unreported results, we segment our sample of firm–years by the entrenchment
index (E index) from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) into entrenched (E index of
5 or above) and non–entrenched (E index below 5). We find that our results still hold
in both subsample, which again suggests that weak governance does not invalidate
our main findings.
2.4.4 Strategic flexibility and RPE
A crucial assumption for RPE is that the common shock to the industry is ex-
ogenous for all firms. Galopan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) argue that while the
common shock may be exogenous, the level of firm exposure to the shock may not
be. They argue that CEOs may choose how much exposure to have to common
industry shocks and change this exposure even in the short run. In their model, a
CEO can have private information about the common shock, and steer her company
in the direction where it benefits the most from it.
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Galopan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) call this strategic flexibility, where firms can
choose their level of exposure to industry shocks. In this situation, they argue that
RPE in a compensation contract is no longer optimal, and this potentially explains
the failure of previous literature to find RPE.
Galopan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) argue that this strategic flexibility is more
likely to be found in industries with a high investment opportunity set, so CEOs
can choose specific projects that alter the firm’s exposure to industry shocks. We
follow their methodology and use the market to book ratio and the ratio of research
and development (R&D) expenditures to total assets to identify high investment
opportunities. For each industry, we use the median market to book ratio or R&D
expenditures of its constituent firms, and then we classify those industries above the
median of all industries as with high strategic flexibility.
We follow the specification of Galopan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) and use the
systematic and unsystematic components of firm performance as the fitted value and
residuals, respectively, from a regression of firm on industry returns. We then es-
timate equation (2.3) only for the sample of firm–years in high strategic flexibility
industries. Galopan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) argue that in high flexibility indus-
tries, the systematic component of firm performance should have a positive impact
on compensation, thus contradicting RPE. In untabulated results, we are able to
replicate the qualitative findings of Galopan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) when we
use equity returns as the performance metric.
In Table 2.11 we present regression results when we use the total firm return.
We observe some loss in statistical significance but results still suggest the use of
RPE for this firms. For the sample of firm–years in a high market to book ratio,
the industry total return is negative and statistically significant at the 10% for the
specification in levels and at the 1% level for the changes in compensation. In the
39
case of high R&D industries, for the levels of compensation the point estimate for
the industry return is negative but not statistically significant while for the changes
in compensation it is significant at the 5% level.
Overall, our results, though somewhat weaker, still suggest the use of RPE for
firms that operate in industries with high strategic flexibility.
2.4.5 Competition and RPE
A central tenet of relative performance evaluation is that the agent cannot influ-
ence the output of the peer groups she is evaluated against (see Holmstro¨m, 1982). In
our study, this implies that a CEO cannot influence the average output of her indus-
try. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) argue this is a sensible assumption since executives
have limited interaction with rival CEOs, so the potential for sabotage, collusion,
or externalities is not large. On the other hand, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b)
develop a model of product market competition where firm outputs are either strate-
gic complements or substitutes, and find that the level of competition influences the
optimal use of RPE in compensation.
We use the Herfindahl index of sales to measure within industry competition and
lag it one period with respect to compensation, so that it represents competition at
the start of the year. We compute the Herfindahl index as the sum of the square
market share, in percentage points, of all firms in the industry for the year. Following
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) we use the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of
the Herfindahl index instead of its raw values. Higher values in the c.d.f. correspond
to less competitive industries.
The U.S. Department of Justice considers industries where the Herfindahl index is
between 1,500 to 2,500 (out of a total of 10,000) to be moderately concentrated, and
40
T
ab
le
2.
11
:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s,
R
P
E
an
d
st
ra
te
gi
c
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y
In
th
is
ta
b
le
w
e
an
al
y
ze
th
e
u
se
of
R
P
E
in
in
d
u
st
ri
es
w
it
h
h
ig
h
st
ra
te
gi
c
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y.
W
e
es
ti
m
at
e
th
e
eq
u
at
io
n
L
og
(P
a
y i
t)
=
δ t
+
η j
+
α
1
S
y
st
em
a
ti
c
F
ir
m
T
ot
a
l
R
et
u
rn
it
+
α
2
U
n
sy
st
em
a
ti
c
F
ir
m
T
ot
a
l
R
et
u
rn
it
+
β
′ C
on
tr
ol
V
a
ri
a
bl
es
it
+
ξ i
t
fo
r
a
su
b
sa
m
p
le
of
fi
rm
–y
ea
rs
se
gm
en
te
d
b
y
th
ei
r
m
ar
ke
t
to
b
o
ok
ra
ti
o
an
d
R
&
D
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s.
H
ig
h
M
T
B
re
p
re
se
n
ts
in
d
u
st
ri
es
w
it
h
m
ar
ke
t
to
b
o
ok
ra
ti
o
ab
ov
e
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
of
al
l
in
d
u
st
ri
es
,
w
h
il
e
H
ig
h
R
&
D
re
p
re
se
n
ts
in
d
u
st
ri
es
w
it
h
ra
ti
o
of
R
&
D
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
to
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
ab
ov
e
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
of
al
l
in
d
u
st
ri
es
.
F
or
ea
ch
fi
rm
,
sy
st
em
at
ic
(u
n
sy
st
em
at
ic
)
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
is
th
e
fi
tt
ed
va
lu
e
(r
es
id
u
al
)
fr
om
a
re
gr
es
si
on
of
fi
rm
on
in
d
u
st
ry
to
ta
l
re
tu
rn
,
w
h
er
e
th
e
la
tt
er
is
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
ca
p
it
al
iz
at
io
n
–
w
ei
gh
te
d
av
er
ag
e
of
al
l
ot
h
er
av
ai
la
b
le
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
th
e
sa
m
e
2
d
ig
it
S
IC
in
d
u
st
ry
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
on
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
sp
an
s
fr
om
19
92
to
20
12
.
C
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
th
e
sa
m
e
as
in
T
ab
le
s
2.
3
an
d
2.
4,
in
th
e
in
te
re
st
of
sp
ac
e
th
ei
r
p
oi
n
t
es
ti
m
at
es
ar
e
om
it
te
d
.
H
et
er
os
ke
d
as
ti
ci
ty
ro
b
u
st
t–
st
at
is
ti
cs
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
fi
rm
le
ve
l
ar
e
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
T
h
e
su
p
er
sc
ri
p
ts
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*,
in
d
ic
at
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
:
L
og
(P
ay
)
∆
L
og
(P
ay
)
L
og
(P
ay
)
∆
L
og
(P
ay
)
H
ig
h
M
T
B
H
ig
h
M
T
B
H
ig
h
R
&
D
H
ig
h
R
&
D
E
st
im
at
e
t-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
t-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
t-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
t-
va
lu
e
S
y
st
em
at
ic
F
ir
m
T
ot
al
R
et
u
rn
0.
06
4
(1
.0
5)
0.
04
9
(0
.4
8)
0.
05
4
(0
.6
7)
-0
.0
16
(-
0.
11
)
U
n
sy
st
em
at
ic
F
ir
m
T
ot
al
R
et
u
rn
0.
19
2*
**
(4
.8
7)
0.
34
4*
**
(8
.9
3)
0.
17
2*
**
(3
.8
1)
0.
32
4*
**
(7
.2
4)
F
ir
m
co
n
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
E
O
co
n
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
E
O
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0.
36
0.
02
0.
36
0.
02
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
16
,0
03
12
,0
91
12
,9
93
9,
85
8
41
values above 2,500 represent concentrated industries.12 For our sample, at the first
quartile of the Herfindahl c.d.f. the raw value of the index is 800, which suggests
a competitive industry. At the third quartile of the c.d.f., the raw value of the
Herfindahl index is 2,453 which still points to moderate industry concentration.
We test if the level of competition affect our findings on RPE by enhancing
equations (2.1) and (2.2) with the c.d.f. of the Herfindahl index and its interaction
with industry total return. If RPE is less used in more concentrated industries, we
expect to find a positive coefficient for the interaction of the Herfindahl index and
the industry total return.
Estimation results are presented in Table 2.12. we find some weak evidence
that RPE is less used in more concentrated industries. The point estimate of the
interaction between the industry total return and the c.d.f. of the Herfindahl index
is positive, though only marginally significant for the specification in changes of
compensation.
The point estimates suggest that the level of RPE is lower in more concentrated
industries, where it seems more likely that one firm’s actions generate a stronger
response in its competitors and thus the assumption that the agent cannot influence
the peer group’s output is more likely to be violated.
For the regression in changes, a Wald test cannot reject at conventional levels
that there is no RPE for the highest level of industry concentration, and it fails to
reject at the 1% level that at the third quartile of the c.d.f. there is no RPE.13
In unreported results, we also investigate the impact of strategic actions on RPE
by restricting our sample to medium and small size firms. It seems unlikely that the
12The general guidelines followed by the U.S. Department of Justice with respect to the Herfindahl
index can be found at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html
13The null hypothesis for the first test is H0 : −0.318 + 0.301× 1 = 0; for the second test the null
is H0 : −0.318 + 0.301× 0.75 = 0.
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smaller firms within each industry can influence the group output in a significant
way, or that actions by this type of firm will create a large strategic response by
the bigger players in the industry. We drop all firms with total assets above their
industry median, and then we estimate equations (2.1) and (2.2) on the remaining
firm–years. Regression results, available upon request, are qualitatively similar to
our main findings. The estimated coefficient for the industry total return is negative
and statistically significant, and a Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis of
optimal RPE use in this sample.
2.4.6 Additional analyses
We conduct some additional analyses which, in the interest of space, we do not
report in table format.
In our analyses we have used a market capitalization–weighted index to construct
the industry performance, this could result in a few firms representing most of the
industry due to their size. We investigate the robustness of our results to using an
equal–weighted index where every firm carries the same weight within an industry.
Our main findings are qualitative unchanged when using this equal–weighted index
of industry total returns.
Some prior studies of executive compensation (see Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a,b)
use median regressions to estimate pay sensitivities instead of pooled OLS with fixed
effects. A few executives receive very large annual compensation and this can po-
tentially bias OLS estimates. In our case, we have taken the natural logarithm of
compensation to lessen the impact of these large compensation packages but it re-
mains a possibility our estimates may be overly influenced by them. We reestimate
equations (2.1) and (2.2) using median regressions and find that all of our results are
44
unchanged with this technique.14
The enactment of accounting rule FAS 123R in 2006 imposed a change in for-
mat for accounting for equity–based compensation, as well as increased disclosure
requirements for pension, severance, and deferred compensation payments.
The primary rule change for equity–based awards meant that these payouts must
be expensed based on the fair value of the award at the grant date. In our main anal-
yses we account for this change in accounting by following the procedure suggested
by Kini and Williams (2011) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014). In addition, we
check the robustness of our results to this change in disclosure in two ways. First,
we stop our sample in 2005 so that we only use compensation data reported under
the old format. Second, we employ an alternate measure of annual compensation
flow that includes only salary, bonus, restricted stock awards, and option grants;
this alternative measure is not affected by the increased disclosure for pension and
deferred compensation. In both cases we find that our main results continue to hold,
we still find significant evidence of RPE and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
optimal RPE.
2.5 Discussion
In this essay we revisit the question of RPE in CEO compensation under a dif-
ferent metric of firm performance. While previous literature on RPE has almost
exclusively employed equity returns to measure managerial performance, we argue
that total firm return is a preferable metric in RPE regressions since the exogenous
common shocks analyzed in theory occur at the asset level instead of the levered
14As Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a,b), we are not able to include year nor executive dummies
in this estimation. The computation of fixed effects in quantile regressions seems to be a topic of
growing work in the econometrics literature but most estimators require a very long time series to
achieve acceptable bias levels (see Canay, 2011).
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equity level. In addition, it is plausible that CEOs are concerned about the total
value of the firm since shareholders bear most of the brunt of the agency cost of
other stakeholders and some executives have nontrivial stakes of inside debt in their
own company.
We obtain estimates of total return by calibrating the credit risk model of Merton
(1974) and, separately, by obtaining market returns for public corporate bonds from
TRACE. Our results are qualitatively similar with either measure of total returns.
Our main findings provide strong evidence that firms use RPE in the compensation
of their top executive. Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that firms use
optimal levels of RPE in the sense of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987).
Our results are robust to potential biases, such as firm–specific pay sensitivities,
different industry composition, strategic flexibility, and the passage of FAS 123R.
Further, we find weak evidence of RPE in a different time period. We find weak
evidence consistent with a lack of RPE in more competitive industries.
Overall, our paper contributes to the recent discussion about the efficiency of
CEO contracting. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004)
suggest that executives enjoy some level of capture over the compensation process,
while Gabaix and Landier (2008) show that the rise of executive compensation can
be explained within a framework of competitive markets and rare skills. Our con-
tribution is to show that one of the main implications of the principal–agent model,
that of relative performance evaluation, seems to be supported by the data. This
finding is in line with the view that, in this respect, pay in the CEO labor market is
set competitively.
46
3. SHAREHOLDER BARGAINING POWER, DEBT OVERHANG, AND
INVESTMENT
3.1 Introduction to Section 3
A large and influential literature in financial economics (Myers (1977) and on-
wards) has theoretically and empirically analyzed the underinvestment problem caused
by debt overhang. In particular, Hennessy (2004) shows theoretically that debt over-
hang distorts both the level and composition of investment, while Hennessy (2004),
Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007), and Chava and Roberts (2008) provide empirical
evidence that debt overhang has a substantial negative impact on investment.15 The
economic importance of the investment effect of debt overhang is quite transparent.
For example, the potential dampening impact of debt overhang on capital invest-
ment has received much recent attention during the relatively slow recovery from
the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Ochino
(2010)).
Intuitively, the underinvestment problem due to debt overhang is caused by the
truncation of equity holders’ investment horizon at default, so that shareholders do
not fully recognize the returns to investment that bondholders receive in default.
Hennessy (2004) shows that debt overhang reflects a wedge between the value of
investment to the firm and the value to shareholders.16 However, if shareholders
have a strong bargaining position vis-a`-vis the debt holders, they may be able to
extract some of the investment returns from bondholders during default, potentially
15Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) show that leverage does not reduce growth for firms known to
have good investment opportunities, but is negatively related to growth for firms whose growth
opportunities are either not recognized by the capital markets or are not sufficiently valuable to
overcome the effects of their debt overhang.
16In the Hennessy (2004) framework, the only shareholder-debtholder agency conflict is debt
overhang. But, more generally, other shareholder-debtholder conflicts are possible.
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mitigating the underinvestment problem. Previous literature emphasizes the role of
bargaining in distressed organizations (e.g., Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), Asquith,
Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), and Franks and Torous (1989)). In particular, sev-
eral empirical studies document substantial deviations from the absolute priority rule
(APR) in favor of shareholders.17 Moreover, as Garlappi and Yan (2011) highlight,
the resolution of financial distress includes debt restructuring and debt–equity ex-
changes that do not necessarily lead to formal bankruptcy filings, suggesting that
shareholder recovery is a broader concept than that of APR violations in bankruptcy
proceedings.
In this essay, we theoretically and empirically investigate the implications of
shareholders’ bargaining power during default on the debt overhang and its negative
effect on investment.18 To derive testable predictions on the effects of observable
firm-specific characteristics related to shareholder bargaining power (SBP), we con-
struct a dynamic bargaining model between equity and debt holders to analyze the
equilibrium firm reorganization during default. In contrast to the reduced form
Nash equilibrium solution concept that is often used in the literature to characterize
post-default bargaining between equity and debt holders, we build on the dynamic
bargaining framework of Stahl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982) and incorporate realis-
17In a seminal study, Franks and Torous (1989) document APR violations in 66.67% of their
bankruptcy sample during 1970–1984. Several later studies confirm these authors’ findings for
different time periods: Lopucki and Whitford (1990) find deviations from APR in 48.84% of their
bankruptcy sample for 1979–1988; Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990) investigate the period
1979–1986 and find deviations from APR in 76.67% of their sample; Weiss (1990) documents APR
violations in 72.97% for bankruptcies during 1980–86; Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell (1996) find
deviations from APR in 72.92% of their bankruptcy sample for 1980–1993; Betker (1995) documents
APR violations in 72% of his sample for 1982–1990. The APR violations documented in these papers
can be economically large. Morellec, Nikolov, and Schurhoff (2012) estimate that, among U.S. firms
over the period 1992–2004, the average shareholder recovery is about 20% of the asset value at the
time of financial distress.
18Franks and Torous (1989) predict (but do not provide empirical support) that APR violations
can reduce underinvestment. As pointed out by Hennessy (2004), APR violations in favor of equity
mitigate debt overhang similar to the issuance of new secured debt.
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tic institutional features of the post-default reorganization process in Chapter 11. In
our model, the relative bargaining power of equity and debt holders is endogenous.
In particular, the equilibrium expected debt recovery depends on shareholder and
bondholder ownership concentration; the expected liquidation value; and, the rate
of capital depreciation.
In the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining model the size of the bargaining object (or
the “pie”) is fixed and the bargaining power of the players depends on their relative
and exogenously given subjective rates of time discount — that is, the more patient
player has the greater bargaining power. In contrast, our model realistically allows
firm value to evolve stochastically during the bargaining process, thereby creating
a stochastic opportunity cost for rejecting offers. Thus, the effective rates of time
impatience are not exogenous but depend on firm-specific variables that affect the
opportunity cost of rejecting the other party’s offer and coordinating a counteroffer.
Under the reasonable assumption that ownership concentration improves coordina-
tion and generation of counteroffers, our model predicts that debtors’ equilibrium
recovery — or the debt overhang as defined by Hennessy (2004) — is increasing
in bondholders’ ownership concentration, but decreasing in shareholder ownership
concentration. In a similar vein, the debt overhang is increasing with the expected
liquidation value of the firm, which accrues to the debtors in case that the two parties
cannot achieve an agreement in a finite time period.
Previous estimates of debt overhang in the literature inferred default probabilities
indirectly from coarse credit ratings of firms. We instead construct a new measure
of the debt overhang correction where default probabilities are estimated directly
from a best–of–breed hazard model of bankruptcy (see Chava and Jarrow (2004)).
This allows us to avoid the debate that questions bond ratings’ ability to correctly
assess a firm’s risk of default (see White (2010)); in addition, it allows us to estimate
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the debt overhang correction for a larger sample of firms for which overhang may
be economically important. We show that our measure encompasses the overhang
proxy used by Hennessy (2004) and Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007) and the
economic impact of debt overhang is significant in the sample of firms where we
can estimate our overhang correction measure, but a credit rating–based overhang
correction proxy cannot be estimated.
Using this new measure of debt overhang correction and empirical proxies of the
variables implicated by our model, we find support for the main predictions of the
model. We enhance the q–investment specifications of Hennesy (2004) and Hennesy,
Levy, and Whited (2007) and find that SBP significantly mitigates the underinvest-
ment effects of debt overhang. Specifically, controlling for Tobin’s q, cash flows, and
debt overhang, we find that the negative investment effect of the debt overhang is
mitigated by higher shareholder ownership concentration, but exacerbated by greater
bondholder ownership concentration and expected liquidation values. Moreover, con-
sistent with the role of the depreciation rate in our sample, higher depreciation rates
ceteris paribus raise investment and mitigate the underinvestment effects of debt
overhang.
We test for causality in our results by exploiting two quasi–natural experiments,
the changes in bankruptcy law in 1978 and 2005. These two exogenous events affected
the SBP in default while leaving the investment opportunity set of firms unchanged.
We show that the underinvestment effect of debt overhang decreases when the law
change benefits SBP, and then increases when the law change reduces SBP.
In robustness tests, we show our results remain qualitatively unchanged to differ-
ent default probability models or extracting default intensities from the market prices
of credit default swaps. Further, our results are not sensitive to common problems
in q–investment regressions, such as measurement errors and possible endogeneity
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between investment and growth opportunities. Our main results are qualitatively
unchanged using the higher–order moment estimator of Erickson and Whited (2000,
2002, 2012), and the instrumental variables approach proposed by Biorn (2000) and
Almeida, Campello, and Galvao (2010). The statistical and economic importance of
debt overhang remains roughly constant across estimation methods, suggesting these
common problems in q investment regressions do not influence our results.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to theoretically develop and empirically
test predictions regarding the mitigating effects of shareholder bargaining power on
the dampening influence of debt overhang on investment. Theoretically, this is the
first analysis to utilize a dynamic (or extensive form) model of bargaining between
shareholders and creditors in default to motivate a structural construction of debt
overhang through the incorporation of observable firm-specific state variables. In
particular, this appears the first analysis to give a bargaining motivation for the role
of debt holder ownership concentration and the depreciation rate in the post-default
outcome.
Empirically, while previous studies provide evidence that shareholder bargaining
power produces significant ex ante effects on the decisions of bondholders (Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007)) and shareholders (Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008), Garlappi
and Yan (2011)), our study is the first to show the effects of variables related to SBP
directly on the debt overhang and, therefore, on capital investment. It is noteworthy
that while the existing empirical literature uses exogenous renegotiation frictions, in
our analysis these are endogenously derived in a strategic bargaining equilibrium. In
particular, our model predicts and we empirically verify a negative relation of bond-
holder ownership concentration and SBP, validating the hypothesis of coordination
benefits of ownership concentration for debtors during their negotiations with share-
holders in default. In contrast, the literature generally assumes that shareholders
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benefit from dispersed debt ownership during default.
The debt overhang empirical measure we construct is also of interest from an
empirical perspective. First, we are able to side–step the criticism of credit ratings
and their accuracy. Second, we can compute the overhang correction term for a
larger sample of firms. Third, we are able to estimate default probabilities at the
firm level (allowing for different default probabilities for firms within a same credit
rating class). Fourth, our overhang correction includes default probabilities that are
dynamically updated based on the firm’s financial and stock market performance.
Finally, the default probabilities do not depend on a particular credit rating agency
opinion or their changing standards but, instead, are generated from a hazard model
of default that has a proven out–of–sample performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we provide the
model of post-default bargaining and generate empirical predictions regarding the
effects of shareholder bargaining power on debt overhang and investment. Section
2 explains the empirical test design, while Section 3 describes the data sources. We
present the empirical results in Sections 4. Section 5 discusses the quasi–natural
experiment of changes in the bankruptcy code. We analyze the robustness of the
results in Section 6. We then summarize our results and conclude.
3.2 Shareholder bargaining power and investment
We consider a levered firm with a stationary debt structure. As in Leland and
Toft (1996), the firm continuously issues debt of a fixed maturity at a constant prin-
cipal and coupon rate. If it remains solvent the firm redeems the principal at par at
maturity. Thus, the firm has a constant debt service of b while solvent. However,
the firm has the option to strategically default at any point. We first describe the
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firm’s investment environment and derive the optimal investment policy. We then
endogenize the post-default game and derive refutable predictions on the effects of
shareholder bargaining power on the debt overhang and investment.
3.2.1 Optimal investment
At each instant in time, the operating profits of the firm pi(K, ε) are determined
by the existing capital stock K and a productivity shock ε. The laws of motion for
K and ε are:
dKt = (It − dKt)dt (3.1)
dεt
εt
= µdt+ σdZt (3.2)
Here, I is the investment, d is the depreciation rate of capital, µ > 0 is a drift
parameter, and Zt is a Wiener process. The total cost of changing capital stock —
that is, the total investment cost — is given by C(I,K). In the usual way, this cost
includes fixed costs, capital costs, direct investment costs, and capital adjustment
costs. Managers of the firm maximize shareholders’ residual value. At each instant,
given the state (K {t}, ε {t}), and adapting to the standard filtration, the firm op-
timally chooses whether to default on the debt or, conditional on continuation, the
investment It. We will denote the strategically chosen (and hence stochastic) default
date by T .
At default there can be violations of APR so that shareholders receive the value
Ω(KT , εT ), gross of direct bankruptcy costs.We will endogenize the APR violations
below. Then using the risk-neutral measure Q (equivalent to the physical probability
measure generated by Eq. (3.1)-(3.2)), we can write the firm’s optimization problem
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as a combination of optimal stopping time and investment problems,
W S(K0, ε0) = max
I∈R+,T
EQ0
[∫ T
0
e−rt[pi(Kt, εt)−C(It, Kt)−b]dt+e−rTΩ(KT , εT )
]
(3.3)
We will model the derivation of shareholders’ value at default as follows. Con-
ditional on (KT , εT ), shareholders and creditors attempt to renegotiate the debt by
making a debt-for-equity swap. If the renegotiation is successful, creditors receive
θ(KT , εT ) of the value of the (now) unlevered firm; but if the renegotiation is un-
successful, the firm is liquidated according to APR, and the shareholders receive 0.
Then letting V U(KT , εT ) denote the value of the unlevered firm at T with the state
(KT , εT )
19 and B the bankruptcy costs (expressed as a proportion of the continuation
firm value at bankruptcy), we get
Ω(KT , εT ) = max
[
0, (1− θ(KT , εT ))V U(KT , εT )(1−B)
]
(3.4)
We will endogenously derive θ in the next Section. In particular, we will show
that along the equilibrium path θ(K, ε) is continuously differentiable in its arguments.
Furthermore, the optimal policy for the firm is as follows: For every K, there exists
ε∗(K) such that the firm is continued at t if εt ≥ ε∗(Kt), and there is default else.
And the present value of shareholders’ payoffs in default along the equilibrium path,
Ω∗(KT , εT ), are given by the non-zero component of Eq. (3.4). Then, using the
stochastic process on productivity shocks, we can write the pointwise optimality
19That is, V U (Kτ , ετ ) = maxI∈R+ EQτ
[∫∞
τ
e−rt[pi(Kt, εt) − C(It,Kt)]dt
]
. We note that because
the productivity shocks follow a geometric Brownian motion with positive drift (cf. (3.2)), V S(·, ε)
is continuous in ε and strictly increasing in it.
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conditions for (3.3) as the Bellman equation
rW S(K, ε) = max
I∈R+
{
pi(K, ε)− C(I,K)− b+ (I − δK)W SK(K, ε)
+ µεW Sε (K, ε) + σεW
S
εε(K, ε)
}
(3.5)
And the boundary and smooth pasting conditions (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve
(1988))
W S(KT , εT ) = Ω
∗(KT , εT ) (3.6)
W Sx (KT , εT ) = Ω
∗
x(KT , εT ), x ∈ {K, ε} (3.7)
It then follows from (3.5) that the optimal investment policy pointwise satisfies
CI(I
∗, K) = W SK(K, ε) ≡ q(K, ε) (3.8)
where q(K, ε) is the marginal q. To derive an empirically version of (3.8), we will pa-
rameterize the adjustment cost function to have both convex and non-convex compo-
nents, as suggested by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). Hence, the total investment
costs are
C(I,K) = a(K) + pI +
f
2
(
I
K
)2
K (3.9)
Here, p is the unit direct investment cost, a(K) are fixed costs that include the non-
convex component of adjustment costs, and the last component of Eq. (3.9) are the
convex adjustment costs (see Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)). Plugging this in Eq.
(3.8) yields an optimal investment equation that is linear in the marginal q :
I
K
= α + γq(K, ε) (3.10)
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where α ≡ −p/f, γ = 1/f. Now, to express (3.10) in terms of the average q ≡ Q, we
use the following result:
Proposition 1. At any t ∈ [0, T ), the marginal q, conditional on the state (Kt, εt),
is related to the Q according to:
q(Kt, εt) = Q(Kt, εt)−
EQt
[
e−r(T−t)
{
θ(KT , εT )V
U(KT , εT )(1−B)
}
Kt, εt
]
Kt
(3.11)
Using (3.11) in (3.10), we then get an estimable equation of the form:
I
K
= α + ψ1Q− ψ2
(
V U(1−B)
K
)
+ ψ3
(
(1− θ)V U(1−B)
K
)
(3.12)
where, theory imposes the restriction ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ3 = γ. As in Hennessy (2004)
and Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007), Eq. (3.12) enhances the standard q-theory
based investment relation with the negative effects of the debt overhang — effec-
tively the second term in the right-hand-side. However, the innovation here is the
offsetting effect of shareholder bargaining power (SBP), represented by the last item
in the right-hand-side. To give this investment model empirical content we need
refutable predictions on the drivers of SBP. In the next section, we endogenize SBP
(θ) and derive these predictions through comparative statics.
3.2.2 Post-default bargaining
Following default at T , shareholders and creditors attempt to renegotiate the
debt through a mutually acceptable debt-for-equity swap θ, which represents the
creditors’ share of cash flows in the reorganized all-equity (or unlevered) firm. We
model this bargaining through alternating proposals in a manner that is consistent
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with practice. In Chapter 11 reorganizations, the corporation has a fixed time period
(typically 120 days) to file for a reorganization plan, which the creditors can accept
or reject.20 Following this timing protocol, we assume that in the bargaining game
shareholders move first and θ to the creditors. If creditors reject this proposal, they
are expected to devise an alternate plan that is offered to equity holders, and the
process continues till an agreement is reached, or the firm is liquidated. For simplicity,
we assume that the firm suspends investment and the evolution of the productivity
process is suppressed till a settlement is reached.21
The situation at hand is consistent with the Rubinstein (1982) model of sequen-
tial bargaining where the objective is the division of the ‘pie’ V U(KT , εT ).
22 As is
well known, along the equilibrium path, the first offer with the share being deter-
mined by the subjective discount rates of the bargaining parties. We posit that in the
situation at hand the discount factors for creditors and equity holders will depend
on the time required to develop counteroffers. Intuitively, if creditors/shareholders
know that a relatively long time will be required to develop and finalize counteroffers
from their side, then they are less likely to reject offers because of the higher op-
portunity costs from delayed resumption of cash flows. Furthermore, the literature
suggests that the time for developing and responding to offers is negatively related to
the ownership concentration because greater concentration, ceteris paribus, reduces
the coordination costs (Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and Aslan and Kumar
20Grinblatt and Titman (2002, Chapter 16) provide a good summary of the U.S. bankruptcy
process.
21The assumption of suspended investment during the renegotiations, while made for simplicity
here, is not unrealisitic since major new investment programs are typically not undertaken (or
allowed) during active renegotiations between creditors and equityholders.
22Stahl (1973) models a finite offer bargaining game, while Rubinstein (1982) does not restrict
the number of offers ex ante. In practice, Chapter 11 reorganizations typically do not have fixed
(or common knowledge) time limits ex ante. And since the number of offers and counter offers can
be arbitrarily large, the Rubinstein (1982) model appears to be a reasonable approximation of the
post-default bargaining game.
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(2012)). For empirical content, we represent the ownership concentration through
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) at the time of default, which we denote by
HH S and HHD for equity and debt ownership, respectively.
23 We model the coor-
dination time through the existence of bounded functions ξj(HHj) : [0, 1] → R++,
j = S,D, that are each decreasing on (0, 1). The discount factors for creditors and
shareholders are then represented by δj = e−(r+ξj),j = S,D. And the alternate offers
are made at times τ1 = T+ ξS, τ2 = T+ ξS + ξD, and so on.
Now, let B¯ represent the direct bankruptcy costs as a proportion of the con-
tinuation value of the firm in default. Then, based on Rubinstein (1982), we can
characterize the post-default bargaining outcome as follows.
Proposition 2. The shareholders’ initial offer θ∗ = δ
D(1−δS)
1−δSδD is accepted by the cred-
itors. Hence, under the risk neutral equivalent measure, Ω∗(KT , εT ) = e−(r+ξS)(1 −
θ∗)V U(KT , εT )(1− B¯).
Note that we recover the expression for shareholder value in default given in Eq.
(3.4) by putting (1 − B) ≡ e−(r+ξS)(1 − B¯), where B is now interpreted to include
both the direct and indirect cost of bankruptcy, where the indirect costs refer to the
opportunity costs of cash flow disruption from debt renegotiation.
The creditors’ equilibrium share in the continuation value of the firm is (θ∗) in
Proposition 2 is clearly decreasing in the shareholders’ discount rate δS, but it is
increasing in the creditors’ discount rate δD. Given the negative relation of coordi-
nation time and ownership concentration, we get,
Corollary 1. The shareholders’ (creditors’) equilibrium value following default is
increasing (decreasing) in shareholder ownership concentration, but is decreasing (in-
creasing) in bondholder ownership concentration.
23That is, HH j , j = S,D, are the sum of squares of the ownership fractions of equity and debt
at T.
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With the characterization of the post-default bargaining available, we can now
characterize the optimal stopping time or strategic default policy of the firm.
3.2.3 Strategic default
We first provide a heuristic intuition on the trade off in the strategic default
decision. Fix any time period t while the firm is solvent, with the state state (Kt, εt).
If the firm declares bankruptcy then shareholders receive Ω∗(Kt, εt). However, if the
firm does not default and expects to continue to recycle debt and pay the constant
coupon, then it is indifferent between default and continuation when
V U(Kt, εt) [1− (1− θ∗)(1−B)]− b
r
= 0 (3.13)
Since V U(Kt, εt) is continuous in its arguments, it follows that the strategic default
policy can be states as:
Proposition 3. There exists a non-increasing function ε∗ : R+ → R such that
given the state (Kt, εt), the firm continues operation if εt ≥ ε∗(Kt), but defaults if
εt < ε
∗(Kt).
3.2.4 Model extensions
The characterization of the post-default bargaining outcome (cf. Proposition 2)
is elegant and convenient, but comes at some loss of realism with respect to the debt
renegotiation process in practice. We focus on two assumptions in the Rubinstein
(1982) set-up that require modification. First, the size of the ‘pie’ in debt renegotia-
tions clearly does not remain fixed during the bargaining process. In particular, we
expect economic depreciation of capital to continue while the post-default bargaining
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takes place. Second, in practice, both creditors and shareholders know that offers
can not be made ad infinitum. For example, Chapter 11 reorganizations are under-
taken under close judicial supervision, and typically both the debt and equity holders
are provided fixed timelines for response. Moreover, it is common knowledge that if
there is no agreement beyond a certain time-frame, then the firm will be liquidated.
In an unreported extension, we analyze a bargaining model where capital continues
to depreciate during the renegotiation and if shareholders and creditors do not come
to an agreement after N offers and counter offers, then the firm is liquidated and the
debtors receive the liquidation value V L. In addition to Corollary 1, this extension
delivers the following refutable predictions.
Corollary 2. The shareholders’ equilibrium value following default is decreasing in
the liquidation value and increasing with the rate of depreciation of the capital stock.
Intuitively, high liquidation value acts to raise the creditors’ discount rate, while
a high rate of economic depreciation of capital lowers their discount rate.
3.3 Empirical test design
We now turn to the empirical testing of the optimal investment equation derived
in Eq. (3.12), based on the predictions regarding the determinants of SBP specified
in Corollaries 1 and 2. To motivate our empirical specification, it is useful to start
with the q–investment regression specification that includes a debt overhang wedge
correction (OverhangW ), which is essentially the difference between the marginal
and average q given in Proposition 1.
It+1,i
Kt,i
= αi + ηt+1 + β1Qt,i + β2
CFt+1,i
Kt,i
+ β3OverhangWt,i + εt+1,i (3.14)
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We include firm and year fixed effects in addition to firm cash flow as explana-
tory variables.24 Thus, the rate of investment (I ) normalized by the start-of-period
capital stock (K ) is explained by a firm and year effect plus the start-of-period av-
erage Q, cash flow generated during the year (CF ), and a debt overhang correction.
Specifications similar to equation (3.14) have been used extensively in the previous
literature on corporate investment, such as Hennessy (2004), Hennessy, Levy, and
Whited (2007), Chava and Roberts (2008), Bakke and Whited (2010), and Thakor
and Whited (2011), among others. Our model implies that the specification in (3.14)
should be enhanced to include proxies for shareholder bargaining.
However, one has to be careful in introducing individual shareholder bargaining
proxies in (3.14) because the empirical estimates of the debt overhang should already
include the effects of SBP. Hence, to meaningfully test the effects of individual prox-
ies of shareholder bargaining power, we first need to use estimates of debt overhang
that exclude the effects of bargaining power. We will specify our methodology for
excluding the overhang measure of the effects of shareholder bargaining power mo-
mentarily. Here, we will denote such a measure of debt overhang by OverhangWAPRt,i
to indicate that this measure is based on the assumption that the APR being fol-
lowed — that is, there is no role for shareholder bargaining power. We then estimate
the following equation:
It+1,i
Kt,i
= αi + ηt+1 + β1Qt,i + β2
CFt+1,i
Kt,i
+ β3OverhangW
APR
t,i
+ β4OverhangW
APR
t,i × SBPt,i + β5SBPt,i + εt+1,i (3.15)
Hence, we test for the effects of individual proxies for SBP through their interaction
24We include cash flow due to the extensive evidence of its effect on investment (Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Petersen (1988)).
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with the APR-based debt overhang wedge. We now present our estimation method-
ology for the debt overhang wedge.
3.3.1 Debt overhang wedge measures
Our proposed measures of debt overhang are:
OverhangWHazardt,i =
Dt,i
Kt,i
× Recovery Rate×
[ 20∑
s=1
ρt[1− 0.05(s− 1)]× rt+s
]
(3.16)
OverhangWAPRt,i =
Dt,i
Kt,i
× (1− γ)×
[ 20∑
s=1
ρt[1− 0.05(s− 1)]× rt+s
]
(3.17)
Where Dt,i represents the face value of debt, ρt is the default probability at time
t, γ is the proportional cost of financial distress, rt+s represents the price of a zero
coupon bond of maturity s in year t25, and the Recovery Rate is the industry recovery
ratios from Altman and Kishore (1996). Estimates of the cost of financial distress
in previous literature vary from as low as 3% (Weiss (1990)) to as high as 20%
(Andrade and Kaplan (1998)), we choose a value of γ of 10%, though our results
are qualitatively unchanged for different choices. Of course, the specification of a
uniform γ ignores the inter-industry variation. We will therefore perform robustness
analysis on this specification below.
Hennessy (2004) estimates the probability of default ρt by using Moody’s haz-
ard rates by bond ratings, obtained from Keenan, Hamilton, and Berthault (2000).
Moody’s computes this default hazard as the historical average default of corporate
bonds s years after issuance, grouped by bond rating, for the period 1920–1999.
This choice effectively restricts the sample of firms for which debt overhang can be
25We thank Professor J. Huston McCulloch for making these rates available at his website at
http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/ts/ts.html
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computed to firms with credit rating. Furthermore, credit ratings based default mea-
sures assign the same default probability to all firms within a credit rating class even
though investors may not perceive them as the same credit risk (as evidenced by
different yields for bonds with the same credit rating).
Our base estimate for the debt overhang wedge (OverhangWHazardt,i ) utilizes a
hazard model to forecast the default probability ρt. We build on the large default
risk literature and directly estimate a hazard model for firm bankruptcies (as in
Chava and Jarrow (2004)) to generate the firm–level default probabilities required for
overhang correction computation.26 The new overhang correction that we compute
has a number of advantages compared to the credit rating–based overhang correction
of Hennessy (2004) and Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007).
Specifically, we estimate a discrete-time hazard model to predict the default prob-
abilities according to Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004). The hazard
model allows us to estimate a default probability for each firm–year, using the most
recent available accounting and market information without relying on the availabil-
ity of a bond rating. In addition, we steer clear of the debate that questions credit
rating agencies ability to correctly assess a firm’s default risk (White (2010)). The
discrete–time hazard model has been shown to out–perform other extant bankruptcy
prediction models in out–of–sample forecasts (Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Chava,
Stefanescu, and Turnbull (2011)).
To estimate OverhangWAPRt,i , we introduce a second modification (in addition
to using the hazard model), namely, we do not use the recovery ratio from Altman
and Kishore (1996) but instead assume that APR is followed. The recovery ratios in
26Altman and Hotchkiss (2005) provide an extensive survey of default prediction methodologies.
Chava, Stefanescu, and Turnbull (2011) compare the performance of various models in predicting
the loss distribution and show that the dynamic hazard model of Shumway (2001) and Chava
and Jarrow (2004) performs best in out–of–sample comparisons. Moreover, they show that the
specification of the default model has a larger impact than that of the recovery rate model.
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Altman and Kishore (1996) represent average recoveries aggregated to the industry
level. Based on our model, these recovery ratios already include the average level
of SBP in the industry. In order to better gauge how the debt overhang underin-
vestment varies with shareholder power, we construct our debt overhang measure as
if APR was followed. We do so by assuming that the recovery ratio of bondhold-
ers is one minus a financial distress cost. This in fact represents the debt overhang
correction when bondholders enjoy all bargaining power, which serves as a suitable
benchmark to test the effect of nonzero levels of shareholder power.27
3.3.2 Measures of shareholder power
We employ six proxies for the determinants of SBP mentioned in Corollaries 1
and 2. The proxies we use are: An estimate of the liquidation value of the firm;
the percentage of outstanding equity held by institutional investors; the number of
institutional investors per dollar of equity holdings; the number of outstanding debt
issues normalized by leverage; lack of a public debt rating; and, the depreciation rate
as declared by the firm in their annual statement.
As shown in our model, shareholders of firms with high liquidation value have low
bargaining power since debt holders have the option of forcing liquidation, thus this
value represents a floor for debt holders’ recovery. Our measure of expected liquida-
tion value comes from Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) and Almeida and Campello
(2007), who use proceeds from discontinued operations in a sample of Compustat
firms to evaluate the expected asset liquidation value. We normalize this expected
liquidation value by the capital stock.
27Where possible, we further conduct a minor refinement to our debt overhang estimate by
relaxing the assumption that debt matures in a 5% annual linear fashion. If available, we use data
items in Compustat (see below) to find the portion of debt that matures in each of the next five
years. We assume the rest of the debt matures in an annual straight line from year 6 to 20.
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Our next two measures of shareholder power gauge the importance of institutional
investors in the firm’s shareholder base. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) argue that
better coordinated and more sophisticated institutional investors are able to bargain
more efficiently and induce larger deviations from APR than individual investors. We
use the percentage of outstanding equity held by institutional investors as a proxy
for the importance of institutions in the shareholder base. In addition, our model
shows that the concentration of institutional ownership also matters for bargaining
power, as more dispersed institutional ownership can face higher coordination costs.
We use the ratio of the total number of institutional investors to total institutional
ownership (in dollar terms) as a proxy for concentration in institutional ownership.
We obtain the total number of shares held by institutional investors and the total
number of investors from the Thomson–Reuters 13f filings database.
We use two measures related to the ownership concentration of debt holders. As
shown in our model, more dispersed debt ownership creates larger coordination costs
for debt holders and benefits the bargaining power of shareholders. Since data on
bondholders’ dispersion for non-bankrupt firms is difficult to obtain, extant empirical
studies tend to use outstanding bonds as a proxy. We take the log of the number
of outstanding bonds for each firm in Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database
divided by the firm’s leverage ratio. In addition, we utilize the lack of a bond rating as
a proxy for low shareholder power. Firms without a bond rating have been classified
in previous literature as bank–dependent for their outside debt financing, and bank
debt tends to be much more concentrated than public debt. In addition, Rajan
(1992) argues that firms relying on a small number of lenders may be subject to
hold–up problems, which lessens shareholder power even more.28
28As noted at the outset, the prediction of our model with respect to dispersion of credit ownership
appears different from some of the papers in the literature. For example, Davydenko and Stebulaev
(2007) view dispresed credit ownership as an exogenous renegotiation friction that hurts SBP. Our
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3.4 Data sources and sample statistics
Our data source for accounting information is Compustat’s North America Fun-
damentals Annual file for the years 1970 to 2010. We follow Hennessy, Levy, and
Whited (2007) in the sample selection by first deleting any firm-year observations
with missing data or for which total assets (Compustat data item at), the capital
stock (ppegt), or sales (sale) are either zero or negative. We exclude financial firms
(SIC 6000–6999), regulated utilites (SIC 4900-4999), and public service firms (SIC
greater than 9000). We discard firm–years with real assets or sales growth over
100% or where the capital stock is less than $5 million in real 2000 dollars. A firm
is included only if it has at least three consecutive years of available data.
We obtain stock price information from CRSP, and data on institutional holdings
from Thomson-Reuters 13f database. Information for the number of public bonds
outstanding is sourced from Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database. The sup-
plemental appendix contains detailed information on the construction of the variables
used in our regressions.
3.4.1 Properties of debt overhang estimates
We construct our debt overhang proxies (OverhangWHazardt,i andOverhangW
APR
t,i )
according to equations (3.16)-(3.17) with the default probability being estimated
from a hazard model. The bankruptcy data required to estimate the hazard model
is from Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Chava, Stefanescu, and Turnbull (2011), which
we update until 2010. Bankruptcy is defined as the filing of either Chapter 7 or Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy reorganization plan. The dataset is comprehensive and includes
dynamic bargaining model suggests that debtors will rationally recognize that dispersed credit
ownership increases the opportunity cost of rejecting the shareholders’ initial offer, and therefore
dispersed credit ownership need not hurt SBP.
66
the majority of bankruptcies during 1962-2010. We merge this database with Com-
pustat and CRSP to create a comprehensive dataset of default history, firm level
balance sheet data, and market returns for the period 1962–2010.
We create an indicator variable for each firm-year that takes the value of one
the year a firm defaults, and zero otherwise. Some firms get delisted from the stock
exchange and default at a later date; we follow Shumway (2001) and code the year
of delisting as the year of default in cases where the firm defaults within five years
after delisting. We lag all accounting and market data by at least six months with
respect to the default date so that there is no look–ahead bias.
Following Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004), we use the follow-
ing stock market and accounting variables to forecast default probability: the ra-
tio of net income to total book assets (NI/TA), the ratio of total liabilities to
total book assets (TL/TA), the logarithm of the firm’s equity value divided by
the total NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market capitalization at the end of each calen-
dar year (Relative Size), the return of the firm minus the value-weighted CRSP
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return for the previous calendar year (Excess Re-
turn), and the standard deviation of the residuals from a market regression of
monthly returns from the previous calendar year (Sigma).29
We expect default probabilities to increase with the ratio of total liabilities to
total assets, and increase in the standard deviation of the firm’s returns. Conversely,
an increase in relative size, excess returns, or the ratio of net income to total assets
would signal lower firm risk; hence we expect default probabilities to decrease.
Table 3.1 presents the estimation results. We have a total of 135,447 firm–year
observations and 1,455 default instances in our sample. All of our coefficients have
29 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use a simpler version of the hazard model
where we replace Relative Size by the log of market capitalization and Sigma by the stock return
volatility.
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the expected sign and all are highly statistically significant; their magnitudes are
comparable to those of Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Chava, Ste-
fanescu, and Turnbull (2011). One minor difference with Shumway (2001) is in the
NI/TA coefficient, where the author finds a statistically insignificant negative coef-
ficient. Our larger dataset allows us to find marginal statistical significance for the
negative coefficient.
Table 3.1: Hazard model of default
This table presents estimates from a hazard model with market and accounting
variables similar to Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004). The sample
excludes financials, utilities, and government entities and covers the period 1962–
2010. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one
the year a firm exits the sample due to bankruptcy, and zero otherwise; there are
1,455 bankruptcies in the sample. The independent variables are lagged by at least
six months with respect to the bankruptcy date. Variable definitions are in the
Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm. The superscripts ***, **, * indicate
the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Coefficient t-value p-value
NI/TA -0.154* -1.718 0.086
TL/TA 3.217*** 31.800 0.000
Relative Size -0.196*** -11.449 0.000
Excess Return -1.215*** -12.054 0.000
Sigma 3.902*** 14.329 0.000
Constant -8.158*** -81.297 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.18
Observations 135,447
3.4.2 Sample statistics
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for our variables of interest, including our
proposed measures of debt overhang computed with (3.16)-(3.17) (OverhangWHazardt,i
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and OverhangWAPRt,i ) and we compare it with the overhang wedge of Hennessy, Levy,
and Whited (2007) (Overhanghlwt,i ). To lessen the impact of outliers, all variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile of the pooled distributions. We use the
market-to-book ratio of assets as a proxy for Tobin’s q (bounded above at 10). Our
sample consists mostly of large firms with positive free cash flow, even at the 25th
percentile of the pooled distribution, and valuable investment opportunities (Tobin’s
q larger than unity).
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the debt overhang proxy
OverhangWAPRt,i (calculated from Equation (3.17) and compares it with the one esti-
mated following Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007) (OverhangW hlwt,i ). Our measure
of debt overhang is, on the median, about three times smaller than OverhangW hlwt,i ,
though the standard deviation is actually larger, suggesting a large dispersion. We
are able to estimate debt overhang for about 37% more firm–years with our new
measure.
Panel B of Table 3.2 presents Pearson correlation coefficients between investment
and the overhang proxies. The Pearson coefficients show a negative albeit small
correlation between investment and overhang, given the large sample size all these
correlations are statistically significant. The correlation between both debt overhang
proxies is positive and moderately high.30
In unreported results we validate our measure against the Hennessy, Levy, and
Whited (2007) proxy in q-investment regressions. We find that our proxy has a sig-
nificant negative impact on investment, and when we include both overhang wedge
measures we find that our measure subsumes the one from Hennessy, Levy, and
Whited (2007). The economic impact is significant as well, a one standard deviation
30The correlation between both debt overhang measures is more than just a leverage connection.
As mentioned in Hennessy (2004), leverage is not a perfect proxy for overhang. Further, the
correlation between OverhangWAPRt,i and leverage is moderate at 44%.
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increase in OverhangAPRt,i is associated with a 6.4% decrease in investment for the
median firm.
3.5 Effects of shareholder bargaining power
We test our the empirical hypotheses regarding the effects of SBP on investment
by estimating equation (3.15) with our proxies for shareholder power. Table 3.3
presents the regression results when we proxy for shareholder power with the expected
liquidation value. As mentioned above, the expected liquidation value represents a
floor for bondholder recoveries in default, as such, a larger liquidation value decreases
the bargaining power of shareholders. We expect the interaction of debt overhang
and liquidation value to have a negative sign.
For ease of comparison, in Model 1 we present the estimation without this
proxy for shareholder power but using only the sample of firm–years where this
proxy is available. Regression estimates in Model 1 show that the coefficient of
OverhangWAPRt,i is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.01). In Model 2,
the interaction of OverhangWAPRt,i and expected liquidation value is negative and
statistically significant (p < 0.01), indicating that the underinvestment problem is
stronger for firms with large liquidation value. In terms of economic significance,
for the median firm in our sample at the first quartile of expected liquidation value
(high shareholder power), a one standard deviation increase in debt overhang reduces
investment by 6.7%, while for a firm at the third quartile of liquidation value (low
shareholder power) the underinvestment is 8.1%.
Regression estimates for the proxies of shareholder power based on institutional
holdings and investors are presented in Table 3.4. In Model 1 we again show that
the underinvestment effect of debt overhang is robust in the smaller sample where
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Table 3.3: Debt overhang and shareholder power: liquidation value
This table presents the regression results analyzing the joint impact of debt overhang
and shareholder power on investment. Estimates are from the investment regression
It+1,i
Kt,i
= ηt+1+αi+β1Qt,i+β2
CFt+1,i
Kt,i
+β3
Rt,i
Kt,i
+β4SBPt,i+β5
Rt,i
Kt,i
×SBPt,i+εt+1,i, where
It+1,i is investment, Qt,i is Tobin’s q, CFt+1,i is firm cash flow, Kt,i is the capital
stock, Rt,i/Kt,i is debt overhang, and SBPt,i is a proxy variable for shareholder
bargaining power. In this table, our proxy for shareholder power is the the ratio of
estimated liquidation value to the capital stock. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics
clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
OverhangWAPRt,i -0.134*** (-9.334) -0.111*** (-5.012)
OverhangWAPRt,i × Liquidation value -0.043*** (-3.683)
Tobin’s q 0.033*** (27.454) 0.033*** (27.320)
Cash flow 0.097*** (29.405) 0.083*** (26.233)
Liquidation value 0.035*** (7.081)
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
R2 0.18 0.20
Observations 76,075 76,075
Years 1970-2010 1970-2010
we can compute ownership concentration measures.
In Model 2 we proxy for SBP with the percentage of outstanding shares held by
institutional investors. We expect the interaction of this variable with debt overhang
to be positive since we interpret a higher institutional ownership as high shareholder
power. The coefficient for the debt overhang correction remains negative and sta-
tistically significant and, as predicted, its interaction with institutional holdings is
positive and statistically significant. Point estimates indicate that a one standard
deviation increase in debt overhang for the median firm in our sample at the first
quartile of institutional ownership (low shareholder power) reduces investment by
72
7.9%, while for a firm at the third quartile (high shareholder power) the reduction
in investment is only 1.9%.
In Model 3, we employ the number of institutional investors as proxy for bargain-
ing power. This variable is normalized by the total institutional dollar holdings in the
firm and indicates the participation of institutional investors per million dollars of
institutional holdings. We interpret higher values of this variable as decreasing share-
holder power, since coordination costs among institutional shareholders increase. In
this model, we include institutional holdings as an additional independent variable
in order to control for institutional ownership and focus our inference in the number
of institutions. Results show the interaction of debt overhang with the number of
institutional investors is negative, as expected, and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The economic significance of these point estimates indicate that for a median
firm at the first quartile of institutional investors (high shareholder power) a one
standard deviation increase in debt overhang reduces investment by 2.2%, while for
a firm at the third quartile (low shareholder power) investment decreases 4.4%.
In Table 3.5 we proxy for shareholder power by the log of number of bond issues
outstanding normalized by firm leverage and an indicator dummy for lack of a bond
rating. In Model 2, we interact OverhangWAPRt,i with the normalized number of bond
issues. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) interpret a larger number of bond issues
as creating potential coordination costs for bondholders, in our model this results in
better negotiating position for shareholders. Thus, we expect the interaction of debt
overhang and bond issues to have a positive sign. We observe that this is the case
as the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, despite the
much smaller sample size. Point estimates indicate that a one standard deviation
increase in debt overhang for the median firm in our sample at the first quartile of the
number of bond issues (low shareholder power) reduces investment by 5.2%, while
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for a firm at the third quartile (high shareholder power) the reduction in investment
is 1.3%.
In Model 4, we proxy for low shareholder power by an indicator for lack of a public
bond rating. The data item for public bond rating in Compustat is populated starting
in 1985, thus we restrict our analysis to this part of our sample. We interpret a lack
of bond rating as implying that most of a firm’s debt is bank debt, and, following
Bris and Welch (2005), we assume bank debt is highly concentrated. Consequently,
we expect the interaction of the unrated dummy and debt overhang to be negative.
The point estimate for the interaction of debt overhang and the unrated dummy
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that firms that
lack a public bond rating reduce their investment rate further as a response to the
debt overhang problem. The point estimates suggest that for the median firm in our
sample without a bond rating a one standard deviation increase in debt overhang
reduces investment by 6.8% while firms with a bond rating reduce investment by
only 3.6%.
We also consider the depreciation rate of the firm’s capital stock as a variable af-
fecting the bargaining game between shareholders and debt holders. As mentioned in
Corollary 2, our model predicts shareholder power increases in the depreciation rate.
We compute the average depreciation rate of the start of period capital stock for the
past five years for each firm–year in our sample, and interact it with OverhangWAPRt,i .
In Table 3.6, we observe that the interaction of debt overhang and the depreciation
rate is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that
the depreciation rate affects the bargaining game in default by making the firm assets
less productive, and hence the expected reorganized firm less valuable, the longer the
default process takes. Creditors have an incentive to resolve the bankruptcy proce-
dure sooner, and, all else equal, the bargaining position of shareholders is improved.
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The economic significance of the point estimates indicate that for a median firm at
the first quartile of depreciation rate a one standard deviation increase in debt over-
hang reduces investment by 8.9%, while for a firm at the third quartile investment
decreases 7.8%.
Table 3.6: Debt overhang and shareholder power: depreciation rate
This table presents regression results analyzing the joint impact of debt overhang
and shareholder power on investment. Estimates are from the investment regression
It+1,i
Kt,i
= ηt+αi+β1Qt,i+β2
CFt+1,i
Kt,i
+β3
Rt,i
Kt,i
+β4SBPt,i+β5
Rt,i
Kt,i
×SBPt,i+εt+1,i, where
It+1,i is investment, Qt,i is Tobin’s q, CFt+1,i is firm cash flow, Kt,i is the capital stock,
Rt,i/Kt,i is debt overhang, and SBPt,i is a proxy variable for shareholder bargaining
power. In this table, our proxy for shareholder power is the average depreciation
rate of the capital stock for the past five years. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics
clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
OverhangWAPRt,i -0.125*** (-7.854) -0.206*** (-8.086)
OverhangWAPRt,i × Depreciation 0.505*** (2.955)
Tobin’s q 0.032*** (25.439) 0.032*** (25.596)
Cash flow 0.094*** (26.872) 0.091*** (26.915)
Depreciation Rate 0.283*** (7.895)
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
R2 0.18 0.18
Observations 70,004 70,004
Years 1970-2010 1970-2010
3.6 Quasi–natural experiment with bankruptcy laws
In order to make a stronger case for a causality argument for the joint impact
of debt overhang and shareholder power on investment we investigate a quasi–
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natural experiment where one variable is affected but the other one is not. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act (BRA) of 1978 and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 provide such an opportunity. Changes
to bankruptcy laws affect the bargaining power between debtors and creditors, affect-
ing each agent’s expected recovery upon default, but should have no direct impact
on investment rates since the investment opportunity set remains unchanged.
The BRA, enacted into law in 1979, replaced the Chandler Act of 1938 and is
generally considered as debtor friendly (White (1983)). Some of the main features
the BRA codified into law included the possibility of strategic default. Before the
BRA, law required a firm to be insolvent in order to file for bankruptcy protection,
while after the BRA a firm no longer needed to be insolvent to file for protection
(Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992)). Another novelty of the BRA included the “cram
down” reorganization, where if shareholders and debt holders could not agree on a
reorganization plan a court-ordered plan could be imposed. LoPucki (1995) states
that, in retrospective, the BRA gave debtors “more control than necessary or ap-
propriate”, while Acharya and Subramanian (2009) argue the BRA made the US
bankruptcy code more debtor friendly relative to other advanced economies at the
moment.
The BAPCPA of 2005 did not represent such a major overhaul of the corporate
bankruptcy code as did the BRA; nevertheless, as Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, and
Thorburn (2008) mention, the amendments to the bankruptcy code enacted in 2005
increased creditor power under Chapter 11 bankruptcy. One of the main changes
made by the BAPCPA was to limit the exclusivity period under which the debtor
can propose a reorganization plan to a maximum of 18 months. Under the BRA this
exclusivity period lasted the first 120 days after filing for bankruptcy but it could be
extended indefinitely.
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These exogenous changes in bankruptcy laws are useful for our case since the
effect of debt overhang is mitigated when shareholder power increases in default,
and these changes in law directly impacted shareholder power. If the documented
effect of debt overhang on investment is causal, then the negative impact of debt
overhang should weaken after the bankruptcy change in 1979, when SBP increased,
and it should increase after the 2005 reform, when creditor bargaining power was
enhanced.
We test this in Table 3.7. For each reform to the bankruptcy code we include
the cross section of firms one year before and one year after the change in law, and
estimate on this sample our investment regression allowing for a change in the co-
efficient of debt overhang after the reform. Estimation results are consistent with
a causal interpretation of the joint impact of debt overhang and shareholder power
on investment. The impact of the debt overhang correction on investment is miti-
gated after the BRA, consistent with increased shareholder bargaining power. On
the other hand, the effect of OverhangWAPRt,i on investment increased after the
BAPCPA, in line with the argument that the reform of 2005 reduced shareholder
power. These results agree with the international evidence presented in Favara,
Morellec, Schroth, and Valta (2014) who show that firms underinvest less in coun-
tries where the bankruptcy code favors renegotiation.
3.7 Robustness of investment effects
In this section, we address several possible sources of bias in our results regarding
the effects of SBP on investment. We use alternative models in our estimates of
default probabilities and also study the potential effects of risk premia. In addition,
we address the possibility of measurement errors in our proxy for average Q; the lack
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Table 3.7: Changes in bankruptcy code
In this table we analyze the impact of debt overhang on investment around two
changes to bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (enacted in 1979)
and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. For
each event, we analyze the cross section of firms one year before and one year after the
change. Estimates are from the investment regression
It+1,i
Kt,i
= αi+β1Qt,i+β2
CFt+1,i
Kt,i
+
β3
Rt,i
Kt,i
+β4After+β5After× Rt,iKt,i + εt+1,i where It+1,i is investment, Qt,i is Tobin’s q,
CFt+1,i is firm cash flow, Kt,i is the capital stock, Rt,i/Kt,i is OverhangW
APR
t,i , and
After is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 the year after the change in
law. Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **,
and *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Law Change in 1979 Law Change in 2005
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
OverhangWAPRt,i -1.412*** (-3.326) 0.018 (0.288)
OverhangWAPRt,i × After 0.402*** (2.701) -0.153** (-2.017)
After -0.002 (-0.413) 0.011*** (3.897)
Tobin’s q 0.084*** (6.041) 0.022*** (5.217)
Cash Flow 0.281*** (7.399) 0.012 (1.048)
Firm FE Yes Yes
R2 0.16 0.06
Observations 4,267 3,682
Years 1978, 1980 2004, 2006
of valuable investment opportunities; and possible biases in the default forecast used
to construct debt overhang. We show that our results are robust to these concerns.
3.7.1 Alternative estimates of default probability
A key improvement in our proxy for debt overhang is a more accurate default
probability estimate based on a hazard model. In this section we investigate how
robust are our results to different estimates of default.
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We first construct a new default probability estimate using Merton’s (1974) bond
pricing model as shown in Bharath and Shumway (2008). This default estimate,
also called the expected default frequency, is widely used among practitioners. In
Table 3.8 we repeat all of our analyses except that we estimate our default overhang
correction proxy with the expected default frequency from Merton’s (1974) model.
We refer to this proxy for debt overhang as OverhangW edft,i .
Model 1 estimates the impact of debt overhang on investment, while Models 2 to 7
interact OverhangW edft,i with our proxies for shareholder bargaining power. Results
are qualitatively similar to our previous findings. Debt overhang has a negative
impact on investment and its interaction with our SBP proxies have all the correct
sign. Statistical significance remains strong for four of our proxies while it diminished
for two.
Almeida and Philippon (2007) raise the issue that financial distress is more likely
to occur during bad times and risk averse investors are particularly sensitive to this.
The authors argue that accounting for risk premia is important when computing
estimates of financial distress. Our default probabilities estimated from the hazard
model represent real–world probabilities, and as such may not properly account for
this risk premia.
We address this concern in two ways. First, we use credit default swap (CDS)
prices to obtain an estimate of the risk–neutral default intensity, and then use this
as our default probability in equation (3.17). We follow the methodology presented
in Veronesi and Zingales (2010) to back out the default intensity from observed
CDS prices; however, given data restrictions we can only compute this probability
starting in 2004 and only for firms with publicly traded bonds, hence our sample is
substantially reduced. We call this debt overhang measure obtained from CDS de-
fault probabilities as OverhangW cdst,i , estimation results are presented in Table 3.9.
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The impact of debt overhang on investment remains negative and statistically signif-
icant. Moreover, despite the constrained sample size four of our shareholder power
proxies are statistically significant with the correct sign, while one is insignificant.
A second way we address the issue of risk premia is by adjusting the default
probabilities from our hazard model by using the risk–adjustment ratios presented
in Table 3 of Almeida and Philippon (2007). Since these adjustment ratios differ
by credit rating, we risk–adjust the default probability for every firm–year in our
sample based on the firm’s rating, and for firm–years missing a credit rating we use
the predicted rating from Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998). In unreported results
available upon request, we repeat our main analyses with this risk–adjusted default
probability. Results remain broadly consistent with our hypothesis. All point esti-
mates have the correct sign, and four of our SBP proxies are statistically significant
at the 5% level. The impact on investment of the debt overhang correction is nega-
tive but the impact is mitigated for firms with high shareholder power.
3.7.2 Measurement errors in Q
Marginal q represents the return to unobservable investment opportunities, and
proxies for this unobservable term likely contain measurement error. Erickson and
Whited (2000) argue that common proxies for marginal q, such as the market-to-book
ratio, contain an important amount of measurement errors.
We address this measurement error problem in two ways. First, we reestimate
equation (3.15) using a different proxy for average Q; then, we use the high–order
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, as suggested by Erickson and
Whited (2012).
Early studies of investment decision, such as Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson
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(1988), use a different proxy for marginal q, referred to as Macro q in Chava and
Roberts (2008) or qFHP in Erickson and Whited (2012). This proxy measures in-
vestment opportunities only in the capital stock, while the market-to-book ratio
measures investment opportunities in total assets.
Macro q is constructed as the sum of the book value of debt plus the market
value of equity minus the book value of current assets, all divided by the capital
stock. Erickson and Whited (2000) argue that Macro q contains a lower error–to–
signal ratio. In addition, by using Macro q we are in effect normalizing all variables
by the same deflator, the capital stock. However, as Erickson and Whited (2012)
note, Macro q has two undesirable features. It does not account for intangible assets
and, more importantly, it is not bounded to be positive. In our sample, we find
some firm–years with a negative value of Macro q —obviously inconsistent with the
unobservable marginal q. For this reason we prefer to use the market-to-book ratio
as our primary measure of Q and present Macro q as a robustness check.
We reestimate our regressions using Macro q and find qualitatively similar results.
We find the coefficient for Macro q is highly significant, with a positive sign and mag-
nitude similar to those in previous studies, and the coefficient for OverhangWAPRt,i
barely changes. When we study the joint impact of debt overhang and shareholder
power on investment we find that shareholder power mitigates the underinvestment
effect of debt overhang. Point estimates all have the correct sign, and four of our
proxies are statistically significant.
Recent literature in investment regressions has proposed not only different proxies
for investment opportunities, but also different estimators that can better handle
measurement error, such as the high–order GMM estimator of Erickson and Whited
(2000, 2002). This estimator is robust to measurement error but requires Tobin’s q
to have non-normal skewness and kurtosis to be identified. We choose the estimator
85
based on conditions of order five (GMM5) since Monte Carlo evidence in Erickson
and Whited (2012) shows this estimator is more robust to model mis-specification.
The Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) estimator is not a panel but, rather, a cross
sectional estimator. Thus, we first carry out a within transformation in our variables
to account for firm and years effects. We then compute the GMM5 estimates for
each fiscal year and present the minimum distance estimates, as recommended by
Erickson and Whited (2012)l. We employ a grid of starting values to ensure that our
results represent a global minimum to the GMM objective function.
Table 3.10 presents regression estimates. Our results are consistent with those
of Erickson and Whited (2012). We observe a higher R2 while the coefficient for
Tobin’s q increases, and we still find a significant cash flow coefficient, though the
point estimate is smaller.
In Model 1 we estimate our baseline investment regression and find the coeffi-
cient for our proxy of debt overhang is negative and statistically significant (p <
0.01). In Models 2 through 7 we estimate our regressions with the interaction of
OverhangWAPRt,i and shareholder power. The results are broadly consistent with
our hypothesis that shareholder power mitigates the impact of debt overhang on
investment. All interaction coefficients have the correct signs and four of our proxies
are statistically significant at the 1% level. It is not unexpected that some proxies
lose statistical significance since, as mentioned in Erickson and Whited (2012), the
high-order estimator requires more observations to achieve consistent estimates.
In untabulated analysis available upon request, we obtain qualitatively simi-
lar results when using the instrumental variables estimator proposed by Almeida,
Campello, and Galvao (2010) and Biorn (2000). In addition, we follow the sug-
gestions of Roberts and Whited (2010) and estimate our least squares regressions
without firm fixed effects and find our main results are unchanged.
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3.7.3 Lack of investment opportunities
Another source of concern for our results is the possibility that the lack of growth
opportunities for some firms in our sample drives our observed results. Lang, Ofek,
and Stulz (1996) show that leverage and investment have a negative correlation in
firms with low growth opportunities, but not in firms with high growth options.
If our proxies for shareholders power are concentrated mainly in firms with high
investment opportunities and our control for this variable (Tobin’s q) is noisy, then
our previous results could be an artifice of growth options.
We analyze this possibility by estimating our investment regression on two sub-
sample of firm–years, those with Tobin’s q value below the sample median and those
above it. Though Tobin’s q may suffer from measurement errors, unless these errors
are substantial, firm–years with value of Tobin’s q less than the median represent
on average firms without valuable investment opportunities, while the group of firms
above the median represent on average those with profitable growth options. For
the sake of brevity, we present results for only two of our shareholder power proxies,
institutional holdings and the number of institutional investors, since these proxies
may differ more strongly by growth opportunities, but we stress that results are
qualitatively similar for our other proxies.
Our estimation results are presented in Table 3.11. We observe that the point
estimates for our debt overhang correction are negative and statistically significant
at the 1% level for both groups of firms, in fact, the point estimates are larger for the
group of firm–years with Tobin’s q above the median. This suggest that the impact
of debt overhang on investment is not caused by lower investment opportunities. In
addition, the interaction of debt overhang with our shareholder power proxies has the
correct sign and is statistically significant in both subsamples with roughly similar
88
point estimates across them.
In unreported results we also include an industry fixed effect at the two digit
SIC level to control for time invariant omitted variables that can potentially create
an endogenous feedback between investment and debt overhang. Our results are
unchanged by the inclusion of industry dummies.
3.7.4 Additional tests
We conduct additional robustness checks on our results which we discuss here
but, in the interest of space, do not present in table format. For our main analyses
we computed debt overhang with equation (3.17) assuming that the default hazard
for each of the next 20 years is the same as the default hazard for next year; in other
words, the term structure of default is flat. Moreover, our default forecast is based
on the full sample estimates from Table 3.1, which could result in look–ahead bias.
We test if either of those two sources of error in the default forecast bias our results.
We first investigate the flat term structure of default hazard by instead matching
the average term structure from Moody’s historical probabilities. For every firm–year
in our sample, we estimate our hazard model for default for the next fiscal year and,
when computing debt overhang by equation (3.17), for every period t+s we multiply
this default hazard by a factor so that its term structure of default matches that from
Moody’s historical data. This new estimate of debt overhang has embedded within
it a term structure that matches, on average, that observed in Moody’s empirical
distribution of default.
To account for the effect of look–ahead bias in the estimation of default, we
reestimate our default hazard model with an expanding sample. Our bankruptcy
database starts in 1962. We allow for 10 years to start our estimation of the hazard
89
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model of default and make an out-of-sample forecast for the next year’s default
hazard. We recompute our debt overhang proxy beginning in 1973, and for every
year t in the sample the default probability used in equation (3.17) is the out-of-
sample forecast using only information up to year t-1.
We reestimate our regression analyses with these corrected measure of debt over-
hang and find qualitatively similar results as before, all of our SBP interactions have
the correct sign and maintain statistical significance of at least the 5% level.
3.8 Discussion
The dampening effects of debt overhang on capital investment are of substantial
economic interest and attract much attention from academic financial economists,
policy makers, and the press. However, the available theoretical and empirical studies
on this topic typically assume that equity holders truncate their investment horizon
at default. But, in practice, shareholders have significant bargaining power during
financial distress and bankruptcy and several empirical studies document substan-
tial deviations from the absolute priority rule (APR) in favor of shareholders. Out
of court debt restructurings, debt–equity exchanges, and APR violations in formal
bankruptcies allow for shareholder recovery in default. If shareholders expect to re-
cover some portion of firm value during the post-default firm reorganization, then
the underinvestment consequences of debt overhang may be significantly mitigated.
We theoretically and empirically investigate the implications of shareholders’ bar-
gaining power during default on the debt overhang and its negative effect on in-
vestment. To derive testable predictions we construct a dynamic bargaining model
between equity and debt holders to analyze the equilibrium firm reorganization dur-
ing default. Our model identifies firm-specific characteristics that influence SBP
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and clarifies the relation of SBP to debt overhang and investment. In particular,
the equilibrium expected debt recovery by creditors (or equity holders) depends on
shareholder and bondholder ownership concentration; the expected liquidation value;
and, the rate of capital depreciation.
To test the empirical predictions of the model, we compute a new measure of
debt overhang correction that does not infer default probabilities from credit ratings,
enabling us to estimate the debt overhang correction measure for a significantly larger
sample of firms. Moreover, this allows us to steer clear of the criticism of credit rating
agencies and the conflicts of interest inherent to their business models, which can
lead to inaccurate default probabilities implied by the credit ratings.
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that the negative investment
effect of the debt overhang is mitigated by higher shareholder ownership concen-
tration and liquidation values, but exacerbated by greater bondholder ownership
concentration. In addition, higher depreciation rates ceteris paribus raise investment
and mitigate the underinvestment effects of debt overhang.
We show our results are robust to a variety of issues, such as different default
estimates, measurement errors in the proxy for investment opportunities, and consid-
ering multi-period and out-of-sample default probabilities. The evidence presented
in this essay confirms the economic importance of debt overhang on investment and
demonstrates how shareholder bargaining power and the potential for shareholder
recovery in financial distress can reduce the underinvestment caused by debt over-
hang.
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4. SUMMARY
In this dissertation, we address two questions in corporate finance. First, we
investigate if there is evidence of benchmarking in the compensation of top executives
of firms. Second, we ask if potential shareholder bargaining power can affect the
underinvestment caused by debt overhang.
In the first essay, “A New Benchmark: Relative Performance Evaluation with
Total Returns”, we find strong evidence in support of RPE in the compensation of
top executives. Contrary to previous literature, in our pay–performance regressions
the performance part is the total return of the firm instead of just its equity return.
We argue this is a sensible approach since most of the exogenous common shocks
occur at the asset level. In addition, we cannot reject that the magnitude of RPE
used in the average contract is optimal in the view of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987).
While this essay is not a formal test of efficiency in the executive labor market, we
find support for one of the main implications of an efficient executive labor market,
benchmarking in compensation.
In the second essay, “Shareholder Bargaining Power, Debt Overhang, and Invest-
ment”, we analyze how shareholder bargaining power affects the underinvestment
problem caused by debt overhang. We find that measures correlated with weak
shareholder power, such as high expected liquidation values and bondholder own-
ership concentration, enhance the underinvestment effect of debt overhang; while
typical proxies for strong shareholder bargaining power, such as equity ownership
concentration, mitigate the underinvestment. Our results highlight how shareholder
bargaining power in default can affect the investment choices of firms.
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APPENDIX
TABLES
Table A-1: Variable definitions for Section 3.
Debt Overhang Correction Measures
We estimate the Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007) debt overhang correction
for every firm i and year t as
Overhanghlw =
LTDt
Kt
× Recovery Rate×
[ 20∑
s=1
ρt+s[1− 0.05(s− 1)]× rt+s
]
where LTD represents total debt (Compustat items dlc + dltt), K is the capital
stock (ppegt), Recovery Rate is the rate for defaulted senior unsecured bonds by two
digit SIC from Altman and Kishore (1996), and rt+s is the price of a tax–exempt zero
coupon bond of maturity s at time t obtained from J. Huston McCulloch’s website.
The probability of default, ρt+s, is Moody’s hazard rate of default by bond rating
for a bond s years after issuance, from Keenan, Hamilton, and Berthault (2000).
Our proposed measure of debt overhang is
OverhangWAPRt,i =
LTDt
Kt
× (1− γ)×
[ 20∑
s=1
ρhazardt [1− 0.05(s− 1)]× rt+s
]
where LTD, K, and rt+s, are the same as above. Instead of using observed recovery
rates we assume that APR is followed, thus the recovery is one minus a proportional
distress cost γ which we set at 10%. The probability of default, ρhazardt , is the
predicted default probability from a discrete–time hazard model based on Shumway
(2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004).
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Hazard Model of Default
Following Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004), we use the following
variables in our hazard model of bankruptcy
· NI/TA: ratio of net income to total book assets (ni/at).
· TL/TA: ratio of total liabilites to total book assets ((lct+dltt+txditc+lo)/at).
· Relative size: log of the ratio of the firm’s market capitalization to the NYSE/
AMEX/NASDAQ total capitalization in December of the previous year [CRSP
items log ((prc× shrout× 1000)/totval)].
· Excess return: monthly compounded return for the firm minus the return
for the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index for the previous calendar year (ret −
vwretd).
· Sigma: standard deviation of residuals from a market regression of monthly
stock returns for the previous calendar year.
Variables Used in the Investment Regressions
· Investment: ratio of capital expenditures minus sales of plant, property and
equipment to the start-of-period capital stock ((capxv − sppe)/ppegt).
· Cash flow: the sum of net income plus depreciation and amortization divided
by the start-of-period capital stock ((ib+ dp)/ppegt).
· Tobin’s q: the ratio of the market value of assets to total assets ((at+ csho×
prcc f − ceq − txdb)/at).
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· Macro q : the sum of total book debt and market equity less total invento-
ries divided by the start-of-period capital stock ((dltt+ dlc+ csho× prcc f −
act)/ppegt).
Shareholder Bargaining Power Proxies
· Liquidation value: ratio of expected asset liquidation value to the capital stock,
according to Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) (0.715 × rect + 0.547 × invt +
0.535× ppent)/ppegt).
· Institutional holdings: total of all shares held by institutional investors divided
by the firm’s outstanding shares, from Thomson’s 13f database.
· Number of institutional investors: logarithm of the number of different insti-
tutions holding equity in the firm divided by the total dollar holdings of all
institutions, from Thomson’s 13f.
· Number of bond issues: number of bonds outstanding divided by the leverage
ratio of the firm, from Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database.
· Depreciation rate: five year average of the ratio of depreciation expense to the
capital stock (dp/ppegt).
· Unrated dummy: indicator dummy if firm is missing long term credit rating in
Compustat (splticrm).
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